Meet the new Twitter.com
An easier, faster, and richer experience. Coming soon to all users!
New design
You will now find @mentions, retweets, searches, and lists just above your timeline – creating a single, streamlined view on the left of the screen. On the right, you can see the features you’re familiar with, including whom you recently followed and who recently followed you, favorites, and Trending Topics.
View photos, videos, and other media content
Now, it’s easy to see embedded photos and videos directly on Twitter, thanks to partnerships with DailyBooth, DeviantART, Etsy, Flickr, Justin.TV, Kickstarter, Kiva, Photozou, Plixi, Twitgoo, TwitPic, TwitVid, USTREAM, Vimeo, yfrog, and YouTube.
Mini profiles
You can click a @username to see a mini profile without navigating from the page, which provides quick access to account information, including bio and recent Tweets.
Rollout timing
Monday, September 20, 2010
Meet the new Twitter.com
Mexico’s Top Narco-Blogger Comes Forward | Danger Room | Wired.com
Mexico’s Top Narco-Blogger Comes Forward
- By Spencer Ackerman
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- September 14, 2010 |
- 10:20 am |
- Categories: Crime and Homeland Security
Guns, drugs, murder. Death squads and cocaine cowboys. That’s what life is increasingly like in the wealthy Mexican city of Monterrey, barely two hours south of the border. And an anonymously-typed website called Blog Del Narco is documenting Monterrey’s decline as it happens.
Even if you don’t read Spanish (like me), the images on Blog Del Narco tell the gruesome story. Old, wealthy men held hostage and humiliated. Paramilitary cops in ski masks taking dudes into custody. People walking the streets in body armor, automatic weapons out. Then there’s all the dead bodies and shot-up cars.
Facing a situation like that, it’s no surprise that the blog’s author, who’s not even 30 years old, would want to stay anonymous. Which is why it’s remarkable that he’s given an interview to Boing Boing describing what it’s like to work in a wealthy city turned urban warzone. “People have a right to know why things have become so insecure in recent years,” he tells Boing Boing. “The violence that is happening in Mexico is not because the public reads about what is happening in BlogdelNarco.com, the factors that provoke violence in Mexico are much more important, and ultimately they are economic.”
As he emails Boing Boing, the Mexican government — bought off by the narco-gangsters — wants to “pretend that NOTHING IS HAPPENING.” His blog has accordingly attracted a community of 3 million unique monthly viewers that wants a news outlet that doesn’t “pre-digest the news before publishing it.” That means publishing a lot of raw material — both in terms of how graphic it is and how seemingly unedited it is. Asked if he’s being used for propaganda purposes by his sources, he essentially shrugs: “[W]e’re not investigators, for that there are the police.”But he may have a point about Mexico’s unwillingness to face how dire its narco-crime problem is becoming. Last week, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton compared the rise of the gangsters to the narco-guerillas that plagued Colombia for decades — and even used the I-word. “These drug cartels are showing more and more indices of insurgencies,” she told an audience at the Council on Foreign Relations.
That earned Clinton a swift rebuke from the Mexican government. “We do not share these findings,” a top adviser to President Felipe Calderon told reporters shortly after Clinton’s remarks, “as there is a big difference between what Colombia faced and what Mexico is facing today.” For good measure, he noted that the rise of violent drug crime is fueled by the U.S.’s ceaseless appetite for narcotics.
Whatever the explanation, Blog Del Narco shows no signs of relent in documenting the phenomenon. “[W]e decided to tell people what is actually happening and tell the stories exactly as they happen, without alteration or modifications of convenience,” its author tells Boing Boing. “The main goal of the blog is to help Mexican people to take all necessary measures against the insecurity.” Read the whole thing, and follow the guy on Twitter.
Credit: Blog Del Narco
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Open Source Tools Turn WikiLeaks Into Illustrated Afghan Meltdown … AND A #404
Track Afghan Election Fraud Without Going To Afghanistan
- By Spencer Ackerman
![]()
- September 17, 2010 |
- 7:01 am |
- Categories: Af/Pak
It doesn’t take a crystal ball to anticipate that Saturday’s parliamentary election in Afghanistan will be marred by fraud. The Free and Fair Election Foundation, an independent Afghan poll-watching group, recently documented 583 instances of pre-voting electoral violations in a scant 40 days. And if you’d like to do a little DIY election analysis, far from the reach of the Taliban, a different non-governmental organization has built an online tool just for you.
Meet Afghanistan Election Data, a web-based compendium of security incidents, patterns of previous electoral fraud and demographic stats from across Afghanistan. The National Democratic Institute, an international democracy-promotion offshoot of the Democratic Party (though, like its International Republican Institute counterpart, are less partisan than you’d think), put the website together. The idea is to give foreign observers visibility into Afghanistan’s latest round of polling — something previous elections lacked, especially last year’s brazenly stolen presidential contest. Think of it like a scorecard for judging the conditions of this year’s vote.
Alas, it’s not going to present real-time election results. Well, it will, sort of, but not until long after the vote. The National Democratic Institute will upload election data as soon as it acquires certified information – something that isn’t scheduled to happen until October 30, when Afghanistan’s official election commission releases final results. (Preliminary results could be public as early as October 8.) Right now, Afghanistan Election Data provides a lot of historical information for orienting analysis of the coming parliamentary vote.
Staffers, however, say that the website might feature some atmospheric data — maybe even updates about security incidents — while the vote occurs. Which is pretty likely, since Pajhwok and other Afghan news services will be furiously tweeting the election. And then there’s, you know, the news.
In other words, this isn’t a Pakistan-floods/Haiti-earthquake-style tool for aid workers or the military or anyone else working directly on the elections. It’s a transparency tool that “election observers, international organizations, analysts, journalists, policymakers and the general public can use,” says Chris Spence, the chief technology officer at NDI says, to “better draw conclusions about the quality of the elections process.”
And the heart of the tool is in its maps. Check out this page, for instance. Afghanophiles looking for information from previous elections can access a ton of mapped data — turnout, the womens’ vote, invalid ballots — in order to contextualize this weekend’s voting, all presented in KML, the language of GoogleMaps. Already, there’s data posted on hundreds of pre-voting current security incidents — down to longitude and latitude — polling center locations, candidate lists and much more.
Expect those security incidents to accumulate. The Taliban, which has already murdered candidates for parliament, today released a lengthy statement urging Afghans to boycott the vote and announcing that it’s “striving its utmost to foil these colonialist plans of the invaders.”
Still, there’s much more to this weekend’s election than the Taliban. For a crib sheet, check out our friend Joshua Foust’s overview for PBS. His bottom line: “Everyone Cheats.” Now, at least, we can see it happen, even if we can’t see it right as it happens.
Credit: National Democratic Institute
See Also:
Report: Voting Machine Errors Highlight Urgent Need for U.S. Database | Threat Level | Wired.com
Report: Voting Machine Errors Highlight Urgent Need for U.S. Database
- By Kim Zetter
![]()
- September 15, 2010 |
- 10:15 am |
- Categories: E-Voting, Elections
In 2008 in Ohio, election officials discovered that voting systems made by Premier Election Solutions dropped at least 1,000 votes in 9 county elections.
Premier (formerly Diebold Election Systems) initially blamed the problem on anti-virus software the county had installed on systems running the election software, but eventually conceded the problem was a logic error in its own software and sent a notice to 29 other states using its voting systems advising them how to work around the problem.
What the notice didn’t mention was that Premier’s voting system had experienced a similar problem years earlier in 2004 in Illinois and that problems in Ohio might have been avoided had the company acted sooner.
In 2002, election officials in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, discovered they’d also been kept in the dark about a known issue with their machines, after their voting system appeared to drop some 12,000 ballots.
Although 48,000 people had cast ballots, tabulation software for touchscreen machines made by Sequoia Voting Systems recorded no more than 36,000 votes in any race, including the governor’s race. Sequoia admitted it was a software problem and disclosed that officials in a Nevada county had experienced the same issue weeks before the election, and received a patch to fix it — a patch the company neglected to install on the system in New Mexico. In fact, Sequoia had even failed to inform its employees in New Mexico that a problem occurred with the system in another state.
These are two of more than a dozen examples cited in a new report arguing for the federal government to establish a public clearinghouse to track voting machine problems nationwide and ensure that voters are not disenfranchised by faulty systems.
The report, released Wednesday by the Brennan Center for Justice, calls on Congress to provide authority for the federal Election Assistance Commission, or EAC, or some other federal agency to establish and maintain a publicly searchable database and to require voting machine vendors to report problems to the database so election officials can take steps to prevent failures from repeating. The clearinghouse would be similar to ones maintained by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the Food and Drug Administration, which collect and make publicly available information from consumers, health-care providers and others about problems encountered with consumer products and drugs.
Despite the fact that voting machines are critical systems, the makers of the machines — unlike the makers of other critical systems like automobiles and airplanes — are not currently required to report malfunctions of their products to any government agency, let alone to election officials who purchased the machines with taxpayer money, writes Lawrence Norden, senior counsel at the Brennan Center and author of the report.
There is also no government agency with strong authority to investigate voting machine failures when they do occur, to alert election officials about voting machine problems that are uncovered or to require voting machine vendors to fix them. As a result, there is no central location where election officials in 4,600 jurisdictions across the U.S. can find information about problems encountered with the brand of machines they use.
“The consequence of this lack of oversight is predictable,” Norden writes. “Voting systems fail in a particular county in one election, and then again later, under similar circumstances, but in a different locale. These repeated failures disenfranchise voters and damage public confidence in the electoral system.”
The Center reviewed media reports of voting machine problems spanning the last eight years and found a number of cases where problems in one election district repeated in other districts and resulted in the temporary or permanent loss of votes – sometimes tens of thousands of votes.
Although the EAC assumed the task of overseeing the federal certification of voting machines in recent years, it maintains that it has no authority over machines that were certified prior to its involvement in certification. And since the EAC only issued its first certification in February 2009, this means it has no authority over millions of voting machines previously certified and now being used in the United States. Even in the case of new machines the EAC certifies, it currently has little power to force companies to disclose problems that later crop up with machines or fix them.
Only states have real enforcement power over voting machines and vendors by passing local laws that hold vendors accountable, but few states are bothering to do this, according to the report. California recently passed a law requiring vendors selling systems in the state to notify the Secretary of State and local election officials of any “defect, fault or failure” within 30 days of discovering a problem. Norden calls it “the best legislative attempt we have seen, to date, to address the problems.” But Gov. Schwarzenegger has yet to sign the bill. He vetoed a previous version of the legislation last year.
Aside from state legislation, local election officials could also assert power by negotiating stronger contracts with vendors to hold them responsible for problems that occur. But officials generally fail to do this and even sign contracts that bar them from publicly disclosing problems they discover with machines.
Absent action by the federal government or state governments, Norden writes that a nongovernmental organization — such as the National Association of Secretaries of State — could create its own database to aggregate reports from election officials. At the very least, this would give election officials an early warning of problems with machines elsewhere. But Norden notes that this would require whistleblower protection for officials who report problems, to prevent vendors from suing them.
Alternatively, election officials could pressure vendors to create their own databases of problems where election officials could review product advisories, software patches and workarounds, as well as complaints from other election officials around the country and information about lawsuits and warranty claims.
“County and state officials can and should demand this voluntary action from vendors now, in time to make a difference for November’s election,” Norden writes.
Privacy Tool for Iranian Activists Disabled After Security Holes Exposed | Threat Level | Wired.com
Privacy Tool for Iranian Activists Disabled After Security Holes Exposed
- By Kim Zetter
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- September 14, 2010 |
- 1:55 pm |
- Categories: Cybersecurity, Surveillance
A highly lauded privacy tool designed to help Iranian activists circumvent state spying and censorship has been disabled after an independent researcher discovered security vulnerabilities in the system that could potentially expose the identities of anonymous users.
Users have been instructed to destroy all copies of the software, known as Haystack, and the developers have now vowed to obtain a third-party audit of the code and release most of it as open source before distributing anything to activists again.
Haystack is designed to encrypt a user’s traffic and also obfuscate it by using steganography-like techniques to hide it within innocuous or state-approved traffic, making it harder to filter and block the traffic. Despite its nascent status, Haystack got widespread media attention, including from Newsweek recently.
The tool is still in development, but an initial diagnostic version was being used by “a few dozen” activists in Iran when security researcher Jacob Appelbaum, a U.S. volunteer with WikiLeaks, discovered vulnerabilities in the source code and implementation of the system that could potentially place the lives of activists at risk.
Austin Heap, one of the tool’s developers, has faced sharp criticism from Appelbaum and others for failing to vet the tool with security professionals before distributing it for use. The media have also been criticized for failing to properly examine the system before praising it as an option for activists.
“The more I have learned about the system, the worse it has gotten,” Appelbaum said. “Even if they turn Haystack off, if people try to use it, it still presents a risk…. It would be possible for an adversary to specifically pinpoint individual users of Haystack.”
Heap told Threat Level that distribution of the test program had been highly controlled among a small group of select users, and that all of the participants, except one, had been informed beforehand that there were potential risks in using software that was still in development.“They are all people who are aware of the risks who use other anti-censor tools and had expressed a direct interest to me or others that they would like to be part of the test program,” Heap said.
Nonetheless, he and colleagues decided to halt human testing of the program this week and use only machine testing going forward, in light of the criticism from Appelbaum and others. He said the group would open-source 90 percent of the code before releasing a version to users.
“All of the encryption routines, all the parts that are tantamount to protecting a user’s privacy will be publicly released,” he promised.
Appelbaum, a developer for the Tor Project, which developed and maintains the Tor anonymity and anti-censorship tool, disputed that distribution of Haystack was controlled. He said the tool was available for download from multiple sites on the internet, including Heap’s own web site, which Threat Level confirmed.
Although Heap assured Appelbaum that the program had been disabled by Saturday, Appelbaum found he could still use it without problems as of Sunday evening. He decided to go public with his criticism out of concern that some users might still be unaware of the risks of using it.
Appelbaum said he reverse-engineered and broke the code in a couple of hours with friends on Sunday. He planned to release a paper later this week discussing the vulnerabilities.
He was reluctant to provide details of the problems, which he feared could give Iranian authorities a map to track users, but described two vulnerabilities in the way the system was implemented. The vulnerabilities could allow authorities to easily and quickly identify anyone who used the program.
The issue has caused a rift between Heap and his chief programmer Daniel Colascione, who only recently returned to the project after a hiatus. Colascione told Threat Level Monday evening that he was considering withdrawing from the project permanently due to Heap’s implementation of it and Appelbaum’s criticism.
“I [had taken] a hiatus with the project because I had become disillusioned with our opaque development style and our approach to the press, and I came back because I convinced myself that I could try to improve the situation,” he said. “I wanted a policy of transparency and forthright disclosure of our progress. But after this has happened, I’m wavering with whether I want to continue with that direction.”
By Tuesday morning, Colascione announced his decision to resign from the Censorship Research Center, the nonprofit established to support Haystack. In a note sent to the Liberation Tech mailing list, Colascione wrote that the organization’s actions had done “irreparable” damage.
I would like to stress that I am not resigning in shame over the much-maligned test program. It is as bad as Appelbaum makes it out to be. But I maintain that it was a diagnostic tool never intended for dissemination, never mind hype. I did have a solid, reasonable design, and described it in our brief overture of transparency. _That_ is what Haystack would have been. It would have worked!
What I am resigning over is the inability of my organization to operate effectively, maturely, and responsibly. We have been disgraced. I am resigning over dismissing pointed criticism as nonsense. I am resigning over hype trumping security. I am resigning over being misled, and over others being misled in my name.
Colascione acknowledged to Threat Level that in addition to the vulnerabilities, there had been mistakes in how distribution of the tool was controlled.
“That was the stated policy that everyone would be fully informed of the risks and that we would control distribution tightly, but unfortunately in this instance that policy broke down…. At least one of our testers distributed the copy without authorization and without our knowledge.”
It was intentionally distributed to two dozen people and, based on traffic logs, it did get into other hands — though not many.
“If we had seen a vast spike in traffic, we would have been aware long ago that something amiss was going on,” Colascione said.
The diagnostic tool was distributed to gather user experiences and to examine specific features, according to Colascione.
“It was never intended to be an early version of the tool, just a program that establishes some parameters for developing the tool,” he said. “Frankly, this is a debacle, a disaster and an embarrassment, because this tool was not representative of our final plan for Haystack. It’s a separate lineage, and to be judged on the basis of that is immensely frustrating.”
Heap and Colascione developed Haystack last year after the Iranian government clamped down on the internet activities of local citizens who were protesting the results of the country’s national elections.
Heap told Newsweek last month that the tool would have advantages over other anti-censorship tools, such as Tor, Psiphon and Freegate — which could hide a user’s identity but could not hide the fact that someone was using the privacy tool. Haystack hides a user’s packets inside nondescript packets that aren’t barred by censors or raise suspicions — such as packets sent from officially sanctioned government agencies themselves.
The tool and Heap quickly garnered a lot of media attention in the wake of growing interest over the Iranian government’s efforts to censor and track protesters. But there was one obstacle in the way of Haystack being adopted by Iranian users — U.S. laws bar trading with Iran without a special government license. According to Newsweek, the State Department took a special interest in Heap’s program and fast-tracked his application. Heap told Threat Level, however, that he got no special consideration and that it took nine months to get his license.
Appelbaum said he doesn’t have confidence that Heap or anyone working with him will be able to put out a finished product that achieves the level of privacy and security they claim the tool will achieve.
“There are definitely possibilities for steganographic protocols,” he said. “But I have zero confidence that they could do it. With the Iranian government doing deep-packet inspection and having a copy of their [Haystack] program and [Haystack developers] failing to do peer review, I believe they will never get it correct…. When charlatans make these claims, they should not be trusted.”
Unmasking Anonymous Posters
Unmasking Anonymous Posters
A new legal trend has privacy advocates up in arms: Attorneys are using subpoenas to unmask the identities of anonymous posters to online discussion forums. And the people whose identities are at stake rarely have the chance to fight back.Anonymous posters can seek to quash the subpoena and preserve their anonymity, said David Sobel, general counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center. But first, they have to have notice that the subpoena has been served.
See also: Not-So-Privileged Info
Without notice, "there's no one in the picture that's ready to challenge the subpoena and bring it before a judge," he said.
Since subpoenas in civil lawsuits typically do not require a judge's stamp of approval, Sobel is concerned that individuals and companies are filing bogus lawsuits just to peel back the veil on a user's alias.
"Anyone can file a lawsuit," Sobel said. "You get a lawyer. You file a lawsuit against John Doe. And suddenly you have the authority to issue a subpoena."
Under their terms of service, many forum operators and ISPs promise not to divulge their users' personal information unless requested by a subpoena or court proceeding, Sobel said. But not all forum operators provide notice when a subpoena has been served.
Although it's not written into their terms of service agreements, both America Online and Microsoft's MSN let users know about pending subpoenas, Sobel said. "At least the subscriber has a fighting chance. At least they know what's going on."
Other forum operators -- notably Yahoo -- don't provide user notice. That's raised the ire of privacy advocates like Sobel and prompted users to erect a discussion group about the topic in one of Yahoo's forums.
"When people start to get the awareness that Yahoo is doing nothing to protect their privacy, that's going to start affecting their traffic," Sobel said.
Les French moderates a Yahoo discussion board for "Anonymous Yahoo message posters who are being sued." French started the forum after a former employer used a subpoena to reveal the identities behind his and other users' anonymous posts."They went down to court, filed a lawsuit, and subpoenaed Yahoo. They didn't send any notice to their users," French said.
"In my case, Yahoo provided them information which enabled [the company] to trace me back to Compuserve. And Compuserve, without notifying me, just turned over all the information in my account, including my credit card numbers. The only thing they didn't get was the password to my account."
Yahoo could not be reached for comment. But an attorney for the company who brought suit against French said that the company is well within its rights to unmask anonymous posters.
French and the other targets of the suit "essentially mixed fact with fiction" when describing the company online, said Stephan Pearson, assistant general counsel for Itex Corporation. Portland, Oregon-based Itex manages the records of bartering transactions between companies.
"We made the decision to unmask the identities of people who we thought were making defamatory statements about Itex Corporation," Pearson said.
French said that Itex has a different motivation: silencing criticism of the company's many business foibles. He said Itex has been beset by difficulties, including shifts in leadership, an ongoing Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, and being de-listed from the Nasdaq stock exchange for failing to file an annual report in 1998.
"I believe the reason Itex filed the suit was to chill speech -- free speech -- there on Yahoo's boards," French said, adding that financial discussion boards are one way to keep companies honest, and remind the board of directors that investors are watching their every action.
Pearson disagreed.
"Our action is a defamation-of-business kind of action and defamation has never been protected speech," he said. Some defendants named in the suit after they were unmasked were dropped from it when it was determined that their comments didn't harm the company in an illegal way, he added.Regardless of the outcome of French and Itex's suit, privacy experts are worried the trend will only escalate without additional protections for consumers.
EPIC's Sobel drew into question not only Yahoo's practices, but TrustE's as well. TrustE awards seals to Web pages and companies who adhere to their strict privacy policy standards.
How can TrustE grant Yahoo a privacy seal when the company coughs up personal information without providing notice of a subpoena to users, Sobel asked.
"It's not part of our program to require that they do put the user on notice of a subpoena," said Paola Benassi, TrustE spokeswoman. "If it becomes an issue, we'll definitely see what makes the most sense."
Benassi defended Yahoo's privacy policy because she said it gives users notice that their information will be given out when Yahoo is served with a subpoena. She speculated that one cause for the lack of subpoena notice may be the volume of subpoenas, and the fact that many users are likely to set up accounts with false information.
Privacy advocates remain concerned.
"I think the word is rapidly spreading in the legal community that this is a great way to get information," said Sobel. "I think it is only matter of time before it becomes the norm in divorce cases -- the possibilities are endless."
Ex-General Declares Total War on Defense Secretary | Danger Room | Wired.com
Ex-General Declares Total War on Defense Secretary
- By Spencer Ackerman
![]()
- September 17, 2010 |
- 3:11 pm |
- Categories: Air Force
Defense Secretary Robert Gates came into the Pentagon like C.C. Sabathia entered Yankee Stadium. Not only did he help revitalize a military beaten down by Iraq, Afghanistan and Donald Rumsfeld, he focused on fundamentals, like slashing seemingly-permanent waste. Accordingly, he’s gotten a lot of good press, ourselves definitely included. So it falls to Charlie Dunlap — a pal of ours, an iconoclast and a retired Air Force two-star general — to say that Gates, like CC, is more fat than muscle.
In a guest post on Tom Ricks’ Foreign Policy blog today, Dunlap circles the defense secretary’s office and drops bombs until the rubble bounces. Think Gates responsibly reoriented the Pentagon to support the Iraq and Afghanistan wars? Actually, he’s irresponsibly ignoring future threats like China, Dunlap argues. Think Gates bravely challenged the military’s generals not to live so high on the hog? Actually, he’s a hypocrite who goes yachting on the Potomac at taxpayer expense. Think Gates ended Donald Rumsfeld’s culture of military conformity? Actually, he gives dissenters the sack and executes a vendetta against the Air Force.
That just scratches the surface of how caustic and personal Dunlap’s critique is. Dunlap derides Gates’ CIA background as a way of arguing that he easily bamboozles people. “He also collected a huge $525,000 compensation package from taxpayer-supported Texas A & M University,” Dunlap writes. “I’m sure he earned it, but shouldn’t a general’s warfighting insights that might save someone’s son or daughter be as valued as overseeing Aggie football prospects?” That’s the Pentagon equivalent of Jim Jones and Cam’ron’s unexpectedly brutal attack on Kanye West.
It’s true that Gates has fired a lot of top brass since taking office in 2007: General Michael Moseley, the Air Force chief of staff; Major General George W. Weightman, commander of Walter Reed Army Medical Center; Admiral William Fallon, Central Command chief; Major General David Heinz, head of the Joint Strike Fighter program — we could be here all day. So perhaps what’s most surprising about Dunlap’s piece that no other officer wrote it sooner. There’s been no “Revolt of the Generals” of the sort that Rumsfeld faced in 2006 from ex-officers who wanted him fired. And unlike Rumsfeld, Gates has actively attacked “brass creep,” making the provocative case that the military has too many useless generals.
But Dunlap, a career military lawyer, is the opposite of a conventional general. Back when he was a major in 1992, Dunlap became (in)famous because of an essay, “The Origins of the Military Coup of 2012,” which used a sci-fi trope to argue that the armed forces’ drift into traditionally civilian activities like disaster relief augured a disaster in civil-military relations. The concept of non-state actors using national or international laws as weapons against more-powerful adversaries? Dunlap invented it. When counterinsurgency theory became all the rage in military circles, Dunlap fired back with a monograph, “Shortchanging The Joint Fight,” that accused its advocates of sacrificing the military services’ ability to work together on the altar of a marginal form of warfare.
Depending on who you ask, Dunlap is either a few fighters short of a squadron or one of the Air Force’s most strategic thinkers — someone brave or buck-wild enough to publicly confront Pentagon orthodoxy. But Dunlap isn’t an officer anymore: he decamped for Duke Law School in June after spending the last few years in the Air Force Judge Advocate General’s office.
Conspicuously, Dunlap only obliquely attacks Gates’s big, legacy-defining project: getting rid of billions in Pentagon bloat, a task that’s led him to axe a ton of programs, including the Air Force’s beloved F-22 fighter jet. Dunlap’s post doesn’t have anything to say about the effort as a whole. Instead, he goes after Gates for “indulging near-term wants (and perceived needs) at the expense of long-term strategic interests,” buying MRAPs and unmanned drones while China modernizes its military — a challenge which just so conveniently dovetails with the Air Force’s arguments for more money. “Today’s thinking about defense spending is hobbled by the Pentagon’s inability to distinguish sufficiently between the serious challenge of irregular wars, and the need to deter truly existential threats posed by nation-states,” Dunlap accuses.
And that exposes Dunlap to a countercharge: that his beef with Gates is really just Air Force and general-officer parochialism. China’s military budget is growing, but it’s about $78 billion; ours is over $700 billion. Not only does Dunlap sidestep an argument about the appropriate size of the Pentagon budget, he doesn’t make a case about how “serious” the challenge of today’s “irregular wars” really are. (The closest he comes there is a vague prediction that the surge will fail in Afghanistan, compelling the Obama administration to enact Vice President Biden’s “Counterterrorism Plus” strategy as a fallback.) That makes it fairly easy for both men to talk past one another.
I left messages with Dunlap for this post but haven’t heard back. (Gates’s spokesman, Geoff Morrell, declined to comment.) I’ll update when I get replies or when others join the fray. Dunlap probably speaks for more than just himself on this one.
Credit: USAF
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New Gaza War Reports Combine Tweets, Maps, SMS | Danger Room | Wired.com
New Gaza War Reports Combine Tweets, Maps, SMS
- By Noah Shachtman
![]()
- January 5, 2009 |
- 9:11 am |
- Categories: Info War, Israel, Terrorists, Guerillas, Pirates
Getting tweets from the war zone is so 2008. The latest social media advance combines tools like Twitter, text messaging, and online mapping to gather up first-hand reports, straight from Gaza.The effort, from Al Jazeera Labs, just got started; the reporting is still spotty, and the technology is very much in the testing phase. But the idea is for residents of Israel, Gaza and the West Bank to send quick updates about the conflict from their computers or mobile phones, through SMS or Twitter. The results are then verified, and posted to a Microsoft Virtual Earth map.
"Heavy fighting continues in eastern Gaza. Loud explosions, presumed to be artillery, and machine gun fire heard," one report says. "Palestinian medics confirm Israeli soldiers have shot and killed a
20-year-old man during clashes at a Gaza protest in Qalqilya, West Bank," reads another. "Nine Egyptian lorries carrying medicine and aid have entered Gaza," notes a third.
As Zero Intelligence Agents notes, Al Jazeera is using an open-source software tool called Ushahidi (Swahili for "testimony") for the online reporting experiment. The program was created in early 2008, to document the post-election violence in Kenya. Coders in Kenya, South Africa, Malawi, Ghana, Netherlands and the United States have contributed to its development.
Meanwhile, that oh-so-old school way to follow war news, Twitter, is bubbling with minute-to-minute updates from both sides of the Israel-Hamas divide.
ALSO:
- Israelis Take Over Hamas’ TV Station
- Gaza Ground War Begins
- Bad Katyusha Poetry
- Israel Calls Gazans Before Bombing
- Has Israel Learned From the Hezbollah War?
- YouTube, Twitter: Weapons in Israel’s Info War
- Israeli Jets Drop ‘Small Smart Bomb’ in Gaza Strikes
- Israel Targets ‘Terror Tunnels’ (and Viagra Highway)
- Paper: Gaza Campaign Planned Months in Advance
- Israel’s Anti-Rocket Defenses Still Taking Shape
- Hamas Fighters ‘Using Hezbollah as a Model’
- Israel Unleashes Retaliatory Air Armada
- Hamas’ YouTube Ripoff, Dead Again
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/01/getting-tweets/
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Open Source Tools Turn WikiLeaks Into Illustrated Afghan Meltdown …
Google Earth Project Maps the Fallen in Iraq and Afghanistan …
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Why the U.S. Should Send Troops (and Spooks) to the Congo | Danger Room | Wired.com
Why the U.S. Should Send Troops (and Spooks) to the Congo
- By David Axe
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- September 20, 2010 |
- 12:01 am |
- Categories: Terrorists, Guerillas, Pirates
DUNGU, Democratic Republic of Congo — They arrive in the night like monsters. In northeastern Congo, in a swath of thick forest the size of some European countries, the apocalyptic Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group is a constant, foreboding presence. The LRA’s fighters — many of them kidnapped teens — murder, abduct, rape and pillage while constantly eluding a half-heartedly pursuing Congolese army.
Suzane Fulale was just 15 when she was kidnapped last year and forced to “marry” an LRA fighter. Freed by a Ugandan army raid, today the slightly-built Fulale is mother to an eight-month-old “LRA baby.” When she recounts her months in captivity, she casts her dark eyes to the ground and speaks in a barely-audible whisper.
Fulale’s is the human face of an escalating but (in the West) rarely-reported crisis. In Sudan, in the Central African Republic, and especially in Congo, border-hopping LRA fighters drive before them thousands of refugees, disrupt agriculture and transportation, and undermine already-fragile governments. In short, the LRA is one of the greatest dangers in a part of the world that’s full of them. And there’s a possible, clear-cut American military solution — a rare thing in this era of seemingly endless counter-insurgency campaigns. But does Washington care enough to act?
I’m in Congo at the moment reporting and researching a new graphic novel. This is the refrain I’ve heard numerous times from U.S. government sources and the aid community, always off the record: Unlike insurgent groups such as the Taliban, Somalia’s Al Shabab or one of Congo’s other rebel armies, these days LRA doesn’t want anything except to survive and pillage. They don’t have political aims. There’s no hope of accommodating them as a group. What began in the 1980s as a Ugandan rebel movement with actual grievances is now just a roving tribe of killers. The LRA is organized around a half-dozen key chieftans answering to top man Joseph Kony, who loosely directs scattered bands of fighters by way of stolen satellite phones. If you want to destroy the LRA, sources say, you only need to kill or capture the leaders: there’s no grassroots support that would sustain the LRA while it rebuilds its leadership.
Problem is, Congo can’t handle the task of taking down the LRA. With just 300 miles of paved roads in the whole country and no air force to speak of, the Congolese military can’t move fast enough to keep up with the LRA. Besides, the Congolese army has been cobbled together from various former rebel groups plus troops inherited from the country’s previous regime. “There is very little discipline,” Marcel Stoessel, Congo director for the aid group Oxfam U.K., said of the Congolese army. To beat the LRA, Congo needs help from an army adept at locating elusive groups in rough terrain, and an air force trained to speed small, lethal teams to the battle zone. Sound like any military we know?
Two years ago, the U.S. formed a new command to handle most of the African continent. Africa Command — based in Germany to avoid accusations of colonialism — is by necessity a new kind of military organization. With most American forces devoted to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Africom has to be pretty light. There are just a few thousand people permanently assigned, many of them civilian contractors. When Africom needs a couple hundred troops for a training exercise or some small-scale humanitarian operation, it borrows them from the National Guard or some other, bigger regional command.
Africom is not designed to mount Afghanistan-size wars. It’s all about brief, targeted intervention, influence and the Pentagon’s new favorite word, “partnership.” “Admittedly, this is an indirect and long-term approach,” Maj. Gen. William Garrett, then-commander of Africom’s land troops, told me earlier this year. Recently, U.S. Special Forces helped form a new “model” Congolese army battalion. And earlier this month in Kinshasa, Congo’s sprawling capital, a hundred U.S. Army doctors and medics teamed up with 250 Congolese personnel for a couple weeks of training. “The U.S. has determined it wants to be more involved in Africa,” explained Army Lt. Col. Todd Johnston, the exercise commander.
So why not get involved where it can really help? That’s what advocates of U.S. action in Congo are asking. After all, this is a mineral-rich country that takes millions and millions in foreign donations, mostly from America. So find the LRA, and kill or capture the chiefs before they make an already desperate country even worse.
But do it the Africom way. No massive troop deployment. No occupation. No drawn-out conflict. No headline news in the U.S. Just a few spooks, a few commandos, some airplanes and choppers and the permission of Congolese president Joseph Kabila. By American military standards, it wouldn’t take much. But it would make life a lot safer for millions of people in Central Africa — and might help reduce the cost to the world of keeping Congo on life support. Plus, it could show the way forward for a smarter, less expensive American way of war.
There are just two problems. First, the U.S. military has tried taking out the LRA before, albeit indirectly — and failed. Last year, Ugandan and U.N. forces acting on U.S.-provided intelligence launched an offensive aimed at taking out LRA leadership. But the rebels escaped … and killed hundreds of civilians as they hacked their way deeper into the forest.
Second, despite a growing body of legislation meant to define America’s role in Congo’s conflicts, at the moment there’s no clear U.S. policy regarding Congo and no prospect of one emerging anytime soon. The U.S. military might be the best solution to Congo’s LRA problem, but it’s a solution lacking one key component: political will.
See Also:
Track Afghan Election Fraud Without Going To Afghanistan | Danger Room | Wired.com
Track Afghan Election Fraud Without Going To Afghanistan
- By Spencer Ackerman
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- September 17, 2010 |
- 7:01 am |
- Categories: Af/Pak
It doesn’t take a crystal ball to anticipate that Saturday’s parliamentary election in Afghanistan will be marred by fraud. The Free and Fair Election Foundation, an independent Afghan poll-watching group, recently documented 583 instances of pre-voting electoral violations in a scant 40 days. And if you’d like to do a little DIY election analysis, far from the reach of the Taliban, a different non-governmental organization has built an online tool just for you.
Meet Afghanistan Election Data, a web-based compendium of security incidents, patterns of previous electoral fraud and demographic stats from across Afghanistan. The National Democratic Institute, an international democracy-promotion offshoot of the Democratic Party (though, like its International Republican Institute counterpart, are less partisan than you’d think), put the website together. The idea is to give foreign observers visibility into Afghanistan’s latest round of polling — something previous elections lacked, especially last year’s brazenly stolen presidential contest. Think of it like a scorecard for judging the conditions of this year’s vote.
Alas, it’s not going to present real-time election results. Well, it will, sort of, but not until long after the vote. The National Democratic Institute will upload election data as soon as it acquires certified information – something that isn’t scheduled to happen until October 30, when Afghanistan’s official election commission releases final results. (Preliminary results could be public as early as October 8.) Right now, Afghanistan Election Data provides a lot of historical information for orienting analysis of the coming parliamentary vote.
Staffers, however, say that the website might feature some atmospheric data — maybe even updates about security incidents — while the vote occurs. Which is pretty likely, since Pajhwok and other Afghan news services will be furiously tweeting the election. And then there’s, you know, the news.
In other words, this isn’t a Pakistan-floods/Haiti-earthquake-style tool for aid workers or the military or anyone else working directly on the elections. It’s a transparency tool that “election observers, international organizations, analysts, journalists, policymakers and the general public can use,” says Chris Spence, the chief technology officer at NDI says, to “better draw conclusions about the quality of the elections process.”
And the heart of the tool is in its maps. Check out this page, for instance. Afghanophiles looking for information from previous elections can access a ton of mapped data — turnout, the womens’ vote, invalid ballots — in order to contextualize this weekend’s voting, all presented in KML, the language of GoogleMaps. Already, there’s data posted on hundreds of pre-voting current security incidents — down to longitude and latitude — polling center locations, candidate lists and much more.
Expect those security incidents to accumulate. The Taliban, which has already murdered candidates for parliament, today released a lengthy statement urging Afghans to boycott the vote and announcing that it’s “striving its utmost to foil these colonialist plans of the invaders.”
Still, there’s much more to this weekend’s election than the Taliban. For a crib sheet, check out our friend Joshua Foust’s overview for PBS. His bottom line: “Everyone Cheats.” Now, at least, we can see it happen, even if we can’t see it right as it happens.
Credit: National Democratic Institute
See Also:
Most Dangerous Week Ever (Yom Kippur Edition) | Danger Room | Wired.com
Most Dangerous Week Ever (Yom Kippur Edition)
- By Spencer Ackerman
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- September 17, 2010 |
- 3:48 pm |
- Categories: Blog Bidness
As your pious defense bloggers prepare to atone for our many sins this year, we look solemnly at the transgressions we made committed just in the last week.
We asked some impertinent questions. Can escalating drone strikes bring the Afghanistan war to a close? Should the Army act more the State Department? Can Darpa really help the cause of government transparency?
We embraced the everyday insanity of the security world. Inscrutable PowerPoint slides. Airmen dressed up like Batman. Troops told they’re too fat to work out.
And we stoked conflict. Bloggers versus gangsters. Senators versus Marines. Retired officers versus defense secretaries.
So now we go to wear uncomfortable clothes and suffer hunger pangs to express our remorse, as our parents did and our children will. But we can’t begin this highest of holy days deceitfully. Like the great Jewish sage Joey Ramone, we’re not sorry for the things we do. And we’ll be back to our old ways on Monday.
Tags: Most Dangerous Week Ever
ISPs’ Error Page Ads Let Hackers Hijack Entire Web, Researcher Discloses | Threat Level | Wired.com
ISPs’ Error Page Ads Let Hackers Hijack Entire Web, Researcher Discloses
- By Ryan Singel
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- April 19, 2008 |
- 11:00 am |
- Categories: Glitches and Bugs, Hacks and Cracks, Network Neutrality
Seeking to make money from mistyped website names, some of the United States’ largest ISPs instead created a massive security hole that allowed hackers to use web addresses owned by eBay, PayPal, Google and Yahoo, and virtually any other large site.
The vulnerability was a dream scenario for phishers and cyber attackers looking for convincing platforms to distribute fake websites or malicious code.
The hole was quickly and quietly patched Friday after IOActive security researcher Dan Kaminsky reported the issue to Earthlink and its technology partner, a British ad company called Barefruit. Earthlink users, and some Comcast subscribers, were at risk.
Kaminsky warns that the underlying danger lingers on.
"The entire security of the internet is now dependent on some random ad server run by some British company," Kaminsky said.
At issue is a growing trend in which ISPs subvert the Domain Name System, or DNS, which translates website names into numeric addresses.
When users visit a website like Wired.com, the DNS system maps the domain name into an IP address such as 72.246.49.48. But if a particular site does not exist, the DNS server tells the browser that there’s no such listing and a simple error message should be displayed.
But starting in August 2006, Earthlink instead intercepts that Non-Existent Domain (NXDOMAIN) response and sends the IP address of ad-partner Barefruit’s server as the answer. When the browser visits that page, the user sees a list of suggestions for what site the user might have actually wanted, along with a search box and Yahoo ads.
The rub comes when a user is asking for a nonexistent subdomain of a real website, such as http://webmale.google.com, where the subdomain webmale doesn’t exist (unlike, say, mail in mail.google.com). In this case, the Earthlink/Barefruit ads appear in the browser, while the title bar suggests that it’s the official Google site.
As a result, all those subdomains are only as secure as Barefruit’s servers, which turned out to be not very secure at all. Barefruit neglected basic web programming techniques, making its servers vulnerable to a malicious JavaScript attack. That meant hackers could have crafted special links to unused subdomains of legitimate websites that, when visited, would serve any content the attacker wanted.
The hacker could, for example, send spam e-mails to Earthlink subscribers with a link to a webpage on money.paypal.com. Visiting that link would take the victim to the hacker’s site, and it would look as though they were on a real PayPal page.
Kaminsky demonstrated the vulnerability by finding a way to insert a YouTube video from 80s pop star Rick Astley into Facebook and PayPal domains. But a black hat hacker could instead embed a password-stealing Trojan. The attack might also allow hackers to pretend to be a logged-in user, or to send e-mails and add friends to a Facebook account.
Earthlink isn’t alone in substituting ad pages for error messages, according to Kaminsky, who has seen similar behavior from other major ISPs including Verizon, Time Warner, Comcast and Qwest. Earlier this month, Network Solutions, one of the net’s largest domain name registrars, was caught creating link farms on nonexistent subdomains of websites owned by its own customers.
DNS expert Paul Vixie, who is the president of the nonprofit Internet Systems Consortium, says the problem Kaminisky found isn’t with the core internet protocols, which he could fix, but instead is a "problem exacerbated by inappropriate monetization of certain DNS features."
Vixie compared this ISP behavior to Verisign’s 2003 Site Finder project, which it unilaterally launched in September 2003 and then shut down a month later.
In that case, VeriSign, which controls the sales of .com and .net top-level domains through a contract with the U.S. government, began directing users who mistyped domains names to its own servers, where it presented paid search results.
The move outraged the technical community and eventually led to an ICANN commission report (.pdf) condemning the practice and an unsuccessful VeriSign lawsuit against ICANN.
"Sitefinder showed that [Non-Existent] domain re-mapping is bad for the community," Vixie said. "This would be an example of why it is bad."
While Barefruit fixed the immediate JavaScript hole, the underlying problem — that large ISPs are ignoring a core internet practice to make money and pretending to be sites that don’t exist — means every site on the net remains vulnerable in ways they have no control over, according to Kaminsky.
Kaminsky said he’d talked this week to many internet companies who were pissed, though not at him."I can’t secure the web as long as ISPs are injecting other content into web pages," he said.
The hole shows the risks of allowing ISPs to violate Net Neutrality principles that seek to keep the internet a series of dumb pipes, according to Kaminsky.
"There’s no contractual obligation for ISPs not to change content and inject ads," Kaminsky notes.
For its part, Earthlink says the Barefruit ad pages are useful to users.
"We offer DNS error functionality for our customers through Barefruit to enhance our users’ experience, and we work closely with Barefruit to provide a safe and convenient way for them to find the destination they’re looking for online," Earthlink spokesman Chris Marshall said via e-mail. "We believe that the service provides a positive experience for our Internet users."
Barefruit echoes the sentiment.
"Barefruit endeavors to ensure online security while providing an improved internet user interface by replacing unhelpful and confusing error messages with alternatives relevant to what the user was seeking," Barefruit’s Dave Roberts said via e-mail.
For Vixie, however, the issue is simple.
"I really feel if someone goes to a website that does not exist, they ought to see an error message," Vixie said.
Earthlink customers who do not wish to use the service can instead use different Earthlink DNS servers. Anyone can also use OpenDNS, a start-up that also provides ad pages on domains that don’t resolve, but does so without pretending to be the other site.
The news of the massive security breach by compromising net neutrality for profit comes just two days after the Federal
Communication Commission held a hand-wringing public forum at Stanford University over whether it should punish Comcast for its violation of standard internet practices. The broadband provider was caught sending fake packets to its users in order to reduce the bandwidth consumed by peer-to-peer applications.Kaminsky is demoing the hole publicly on Saturday at the Toorcon security conference in Seattle.
Kaminsky, a well-respected security expert, is perhaps best known for cleverly proving that a spyware rootkit Sony included on music CDs infected computers in more than half a million computer networks in 2005.
Photo: Quinn Norton/Wired.com, Screenshots: Attack application and "Rick-Rolled" Facebook page courtesy of Dan Kaminsky
See Also:
- FCC Gets an Earful From Open-Net Defenders at Stanford
- Commission Ready To Act in Net Neutrality Fight, Says FCC Chief
- In Test, Canadian ISP Splices Itself Into Google Homepage
- FCC Chief Promises to Investigate Net Neutrality Complaint Against …
- Comcast Sued Over BitTorrent Blocking – UPDATED
- Dell & Google Secretly Installing Software to Make Money Off Your Mistyped URLs
Net Neutrality Debate Is Secretly All About Internet Television, Net Pioneers Say | Threat Level | Wired.com
Net Neutrality Debate Is Secretly All About Internet Television, Net Pioneers Say
- By Ryan Singel
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- May 23, 2008 |
- 11:41 am |
- Categories: Network Neutrality, privacy
NEW HAVEN, Connecticut — The network neutrality issue is much more complicated than the debates in Washingtog suggest, according to two of the internet’s most revered architects, David Reed and David Clark.
Clark, a senior MIT computer scientist who spent eight years as the internet’s chief protocol architect, argued that the focus on neutrality is misplaced, because the net hasn’t ever been pristine. The current debate, he says, is really a reaction to a coming tectonic collision between the cable industry’s traditional business model, and the movement of television onto the internet.
The focus of the net neutrality debate should not be on the latest outrage, but on the big picture, namely issues involving money, according to Clark, who spoke Friday on a panel at the Computers, Freedom and Privacy conference.
"The internet is not neutral and has not been for a long time," Clark said "There is not a state of grace to get back to."
"How can we address what is acceptable or unacceptable behavior?" Clark asked, wondering whether it would be okay for a carrier to let a company like YouTube pay extra so that its content doesn’t count against an ISP customer’s monthly usage cap. "If you want to understand this space, you have to follow the money."
"There is good blocking and bad blocking," Clark said. Providers already employ anti-spam measures, negotiate traffic peering arrangements between one another, and block some ports for network management reasons. "You have to understand that there is some discrimination going on on the good side of the line."
David Reed, the co-author of the internet’s seminal end-to-end argument that the internet’s intelligence is best left at the edges, says the question isn’t whether ISPs should or shouldn’t use deep packet inspection technology, or DPI, to peer into packets. ISPs already use the technique to make decisions about traffic, and the tool is only getting better as computer processing power advances.
"I always thought it was cool, and the question is, what do you do with it," Reed said. "DPI is not just reading the bits, It is capable of taking action — it can modify them or block them."
In response to a Charter Communications acknowledgment last week that it planned to let a third-party behavioral tracking company analyze its users’ traffic for advertising purposes, Reed said the model may make sense to cable companies that are accustomed to inserting, and even overwriting, ads in television shows.
As for companies like NebuAds and Phorm that install the networking boxes, Reed suspects ads are just the easy way in.
"I suspect the argument going on in their heads is that if we can get a beachhead, we can offer other services later," Reed said, referring to things like searching for child pornography or ferreting out dissidents for the Chinese government.
Clark sees an odd silver lining in these companies’ ad proposals: if they start replacing ads on web pages as the traffic passes through their networks, websites like Yahoo and Google will be forced to encrypt its traffic web traffic using SSL, a computationally more intensive type of web session mostly used for password forms, online banking and other sensitive transactions.
"As soon as you whack an ad, it will be economically advantageous to use SSL," Clark said. "We should go down that way."
Deep packet inspection and net neutrality proponents’ unintentional reliance on it to enforce principles of fairness are the real problems, according Scott McCullough, a longtime lawyer for small communications provider.
"If we are going to be allowing internet access providers to open up the contents of communication to detect child pornography or hate speech or whatever is the issue du jour, we all lose our privacy," McCullough said.
Though McCullough proudly noted he’s never represented an incumbent carrier in more than 30 years of communications legal work, he’s no fan of net neutrality.
He points out that proposals to give the same priority to all traffic of the same kind — essentially prohibiting a cable operator from delivering its internet telephony packets faster than it does Skype’s — requires networks to peer deep into packets.
Those inspections into internet packets beyond the first few outside wrappers, into areas that include content, means that broadband providers have access to private information. Furthermore, he argues because of the Supreme Court’s decision that people have no Fourth Amendment protection in information given to third parties, the providers are free to share any of that data with marketers or the government.
For that reason, providers must get consumers affirmative consent to opt-in to any deep packet inspection, McCullough argued.
As for unlimited broadband internet plans that dominate the U.S. market, online video and peer-to-peer services like the BBC’s peer-to-peer based iPlayer will kill them, according to Clark.
"If we are going to move video to the internet, it will stress things," Clark said. "It will stress to breaking point the all-you-can-eat for 40 bucks model.
But simply because cable companies will no longer be in the business of curating content and selling ads, that doesn’t mean they will be out of business any time soon. They’ll just be in a different business.
Clark said he tried once unsuccessfully to convince a cable company employee — accustomed to contacting content and then selling it to customers –- to regard the internet the ultimate boon to the industry.
"Think of the internet as the world’s largest content bundle, and it is free to you, and you can sell it to customer," Clark said he told the exec.
Though the exec did not see it that way, that’s the future for broadband providers, Clark said.
"ISPs can make good money selling the carriage," Clark said.
See Also:
- Charter to Snoop on Broadband Customers’ Web Histories for Ad Networks
- Can Charter Broadband Customers Really Opt-Out of Spying? Maybe Not
- The New York Times Calls For Network Neutrality Legislation
- Congressmen Ask Charter to Freeze Web Profiling Plan
- Former Prosecutor: ISP Content Filtering Might be a ‘Five Year Felony’
- Internet Mysteries: How Much File Sharing Traffic Travels the Net …
- ISPs’ Error Page Ads Let Hackers Hijack Entire Web, Researcher …