The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights
cryptome.org | Dec 15th 200516 December 2005. See also:
NSA Spied Inside the US (December 15, 2005) http://cryptome.org/nsa-spied-us.htmHPSCI Clashes with NSA On Oversight (1999) http://jya.com/nsa-clash.htm
US Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (1993) http://cryptome.org/nsa-ussid18.htm
4 July 1999. Link to Part 2 of the report.
27 June 1999
Source: Hardcopy of the Senate Report. Thanks to DC.
This document is provided as background for the current dispute between US Representative Porter Goss, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the National Security Agency: http://jya.com/nsa-clash.htm. And for public debate on NSA's Echelon and other electronic interception programs: http://jya.com/crypto.htm.
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SENATE RESOLUTION 21
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FOUR CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
_______________
VOLUME 5
_______________
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
OCTOBER 29 AND NOVEMBER 6, 1975
Printed for the use of the Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 1976
67-252
________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $2.30
| SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH | |
| FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman | |
| PHILIP A. HART, Michigan WALTER MONDALE, Minnesota WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina GARY HART, Colorado | HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.; Tennessee BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland RICHARD SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania |
| WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff Director |
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| CONTENTS | |
| HEARING DAYS | |
| Page | |
| Wednesday, October 29, 1975 Thursday, November 6, 1975 | 1 |
| LIST OF WITNESSES WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1975 | |
| Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., Director, National Security Agency; accompanied by Benson Buffham, Deputy Director, NSA; and Roy Banner, General Counsel | |
| THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1975 | |
| [Separate Part 2 of the report (346K)] [Committee debate on SHAMROCK] | 57 |
| HEARINGS EXHIBITS1 | |
| No. 1 -- October 20, 1967 cable from Lieutenant General William Yarborough, ACSI, to Lieutenant General Marshall Carter, Director, NSA | 145 |
| No. 2 -- October 21, 1967 cable from Lieutenant General Marshall Carter, Director, NSA to USIB members | 147 |
| No. 3 -- July 1, 1969 memo from an Assistant Director, NSA, establishing Project MINARET as a Sensitive SIGINT Operation, and attached MINARET Charter | 149 |
| No. 4 -- April 10, 1970 memo from John E. Ingersoll, Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to Director, NSA | 151 |
| No. 5 -- January 26, 1971 memo from Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, Director, NSA, to the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General | 156 |
| No. 6 -- September 17, 1973 letter from Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., Director, NSA, to Clarence M. Kelley, Director, FBI | 158 |
| No. 7 -- October 1, 1973 letter from Attorney General Elliot Richardson to Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., Director NSA | 160 |
| No. 8 -- October 4, 1973 letter from Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., Director, NSA, to Attorney General Elliot Richardson | 162 |
| APPENDIX | |
| [Part 2 attachment] November 10, 1975 letter from Attorney General Levi to Senator Schweiker concerning discussion of FBI Manual of Instructions | 164 |
| _________ | |
| 1 Under criteria determined by the Committee in consultation with the White House, the Departments of Defense and Justice, the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, certain materials have been deleted from these exhibits, which were previously classified, to maintain the integrity of the internal operating procedures of the agencies involved, and to protect sensitive communications intelligence sources and methods. Further deletions were made with respect to protecting the privacy of certain individuals and groups. |
(III)
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES -- THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY AND FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
___________
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1975
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :13 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Tower, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater, Mathias and Schweiker.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., chief counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, counsel to the minority.
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order.
This morning, the committee begins public hearings on the National Security Agency or, as it is more commonly known, the NSA. Actually, the Agency name is unknown to most Americans, either by its acronym or its full name. In contrast to the CIA, one has to search far and wide to find someone who has ever heard of the NSA. This is peculiar, because the National Security Agency is an immense installation. In its task of collecting intelligence by intercepting foreign communications, the NSA employs thousands of people and operates with an enormous budget. Its expansive computer facilities comprise some of the most complex and sophisticated electronic machinery in the world.
Just as the NSA is one of the largest and least known of the intelligence agencies, it is also the most reticent. While it sweeps in messages from around the world, it gives out precious little information about itself. Even the legal basis for the activities of NSA is different from other intelligence agencies. No statute establishes the NSA or defines the permissible scope of its responsibilities. Rather, Executive directives make up the sole "charter" for the Agency. Furthermore. these directives fail to define precisely what constitutes the "technical and intelligence information" which the NSA is authorized to collect. Since its establishment in 1952 as a part of the Defense Department, representatives of the NSA have never appeared before the Senate in a public hearing. Today we will bring the Agency from behind closed doors.
The committee has elected to hold public hearings on the NSA only after the most careful consideration. For 23 years this agency has provided the President and the other intelligence services with communications intelligence vital to decision-making within our Government
(1)
councils. The value of its work to our national security has been and will continue to be inestimable. We are determined not to impair the excellent contributions made by the NSA to the defense of our country. To make sure this committee does not interfere with ongoing intelligence activities, we have had to !be exceedingly careful, for the techniques of the NSA are of the most sensitive and fragile character. We have prepared ourselves exhaustively; we have circumscribed the area of inquiry to include only those which represent abuses of power; and ave have planned the format for today's hearing with great care, so as not to venture beyond our stated objectives.
The delicate character of communications intelligence has convinced Congress in the past not to hold public hearings on NSA. While this committee shares the concern of earlier investigative committees, we occupy a different position than our predecessors. We are tasked, by Senate Resolution 21, to investigate "illegal, improper, or unethical activities" engaged in by intelligence agencies, and to decide on the "need for specific legislative authority to govern operations of * * * the National Security Agency." Never before has a committee of Congress been better prepared, instructed, and authorized to make an informed and judicious decision as to what in the affairs of NSA should remain classified and what may be examined in a public forum.
Our staff has conducted an intensive 5-month investigation of NSA, and has been provided access to required Agency files and personnel. NSA has been cooperative with the committee, and a relationship of mutual trust has been developed. Committee members have received several briefings in executive session on the activities of the Agency, including a week of testimony from the most knowledgeable individuals, in an effort to determine what might be made public without damaging its effectiveness. Among others, we have met with the Directors of the NSA and the CIA, as well as the Secretary of Defense. Finally, once the decision was made to hold public hearings on then NSA, the committee worked diligently with the Agency to draw legitimate boundaries for the public discussion that would preserve the technical secrets of NSA, and also allow a thorough airing of Agency practices affecting American citizens.
In short, the committee has proceeded cautiously. We are keenly aware of the sensitivity of the NSA, and wish to maintain its important role in our defense system. Still, we recognize our responsibility to the American people to conduct a thorough and objective investigation of each of the intelligence services. We would be derelict in our duties if we were to exempt NSA from public accountability. The committee must act with the highest sense of responsibility during its inquiry into the intelligence services. But it cannot sweep improper activities under the rug -- at least not if we are to remain true to our oath to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the land.
We have a particular obligation to examine the NSA, in light of its tremendous potential for abuse. It has the capacity to monitor the private communications of American citizens without the use of a "bug" or "tap." The interception of international communications signals sent through the air is the job of NSA; and, thanks to modern technological developments, it does its job very well. The danger lies in the ability of the NSA to turn its awesome technology against domestic communications. Indeed, as our hearing into the Huston plan demonstrated,
a previous administration and a former NSA Director favored using this potential against certain U.S. citizens for domestic intelligence purposes. While the Huston plan was never fully put into effect, our investigation has revealed that the NSA had in fact been intentionally monitoring the overseas communications of certain U.S. citizens long before the Huston plan was proposed-and continued to do so after it was revoked. This incident illustrates how the NSA could be turned inward and used against our own people. It has been the difficult task of the committee to find a way through the tangled webs of classification and the claims of national security -- however valid they may be -- to inform the American public of deficiencies in their intelligence services. It is not, of course, a task without risks. but it is the course we have set for ourselves. The discussions which will be held this morning are efforts to identify publicly certain activities undertaken by the NSA which are of questionable propriety and dubious legality.
General Allen, Director of the NSA, will provide for us today the background on these activities, and he will be questioned on their origins and objectives by the committee members. Like the CIA and the IRS, the NSA, too, had a "watch list" containing the names of U.S. citizens. This list will be of particular interest to us this morning, though we will take up another important subject as well. The dominant concern of this committee is the intrusion by the Federal Government into the inalienable rights guaranteed Americans by the Constitution. In previous hearings, ave have seen how these rights have been violated by the intelligence services of the CIA, the FBI, and the IRS. As the present hearings will reveal, the NSA has not escaped the temptation to have its operations expanded into provinces protected by the law.
While the committee has found the work of the NSA on the whole to be of a high caliber and properly restrained and has tremendous respect for the professional caliber of the people who work there, the topics we shall explore today do illustrate excesses and suggest areas where legislative action is desirable. That is why we are here.
Senator Tower would like to make an opening statement.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I shall be brief. From the very beginning, I have opposed the concept of public hearings on the activities of the NSA. That opposition continues, and I should like to briefly focus on the reasons I believe these open hearings represent a serious departure from our heretofore responsible and restrained course in the process of our investigation.
To begin with, this complex and sophisticated electronic capability is the most fragile weapon in our arsenal; and unfortunately, I cannot elaborate on that, because that would not be proper. Public inquiry on NSA, I believe, serves no legitimate legislative purpose, while exposing this vital element of our intelligence capability to unnecessary risk, a risk acknowledged in the chairman's own opening statement.
S. Res. 21 does authorize the NSA inquiry, and this has been done very thoroughly in closed session. But that same resolution also picks up a recurring theme of the floor debate upon the establishment of this committee. Specifically, we were admonished not to disclose outside
the committee information which would adversely affect intelligence activities. In my view, the public pursuit of this matter does adversely affect our intelligence-gathering capability.
Even if the risks were minimal -- and I do not believe they are minimal -- the NSA is the wrong target. The real quarry is not largely mechanical response of military organizations to orders. The real issues of who told them to take actions now alleged to be questionable should be addressed to the policy level. It is more important to know why names were placed on a watch list than to know what the NSA did after being ordered to do so.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, I believe we have fallen prey to our own fascination with the technological advances of the computer age. We have invited a three-star military officer to come before us to explain the awesome technology and the potential abuses of a huge vacuum cleaner. We have done this despite the fact that our exhaustive investigation has established only two major abuses in 23 years, both of which have been terminated: And despite the obvious risks of this sensitive component of the Nation's intelligence-gathering capacity, I am opposed to a procedure which creates an unnecessary risk of irreparable injury to the public's right to be secure: even if offered under the umbrella of the acknowledged presumption of a citizen's right to know.
In taking such risks we both fail to advance the general legislative purpose and, I believe, transgress the clearly expressed concerns of the Senate requiring us to, if we err at all, err on the side of caution. It is my view that there comes a point when the people's right to know must of necessity be subordinated to the people's right to be secure, to the extent that a sophisticated and effective intelligence-gathering capability makes them secure.
I do not think that any of us here, for example, would want us to sacrifice our capability for verification of Soviet strategic weapons capability. And whether or not that capability was thought posture in a first-strike configuration, I cite it only as an example. Hence, my opposition to the conduct of these public hearings.
I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that through the democratic process, the committee has, by a majority vote, voted to go this route. But I felt a compulsion to state my own reasons for being in opposition.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tower, I appreciate your statement, and I might say that there are two levels of concern in the committee, and relating to the two different practices that are of questionable legality. And so, we have divided this hearing into two parts, proceeding with the portion that has least objection from members of the committee who feel as Senator Tower does. And then we will have an opportunity to discuss further the second part. after General Allen has left the witness stand. And that is the procedure, that is satisfactory with you?
Senator TOWER. I accept the procedure, and it is totally satisfactory to me.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well.
Now, General Allen has come prepared with his statement, after which, General, there will be questions from the committee. I wish you would identify those who will be sitting with you; and if they
might respond to questions, then I would ask them to stand with you to take the oath. Would you first identify them, please ?
General ALLEN. Yes. On my right is Mr. Benson Buffham, who is the Deputy Director of the National Security Agency. On my left is Mr. Roy Banner, who is the General Counsel of the National Security Agency.
Sir, I suppose -- or at least for our initial purposes -- that I be the only witness.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Then you alone may stand and take the oath. Do you solemnly swear that all of the testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
General ALLEN. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
General, I know you have a prepared statement. Will you please proceed with it at this time.
TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEW ALLEN, JR., DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY BENSON BUFFHAM, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NSA; AND
ROY BANNER, GENERAL COUNSEL, NSA
General ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I recognize the important responsibility this committee has to investigate the intelligence operations of the U.S. Government and to determine the need for improvement by legislative or other means. For several months, involving many thousands of man-hours, the National Security Agency has, I believe, cooperated with this committee to provide a thorough information base, including data whose continued secrecy is most important to our Nation.
We are now here to discuss in open session certain aspects of an important and hitherto secret operation of the U.S. Government. I recognize that the committee is deeply concerned that we protect sensitive and fragile sources of information. I appreciate the care which this committee and staff have exercised to protect the sensitive data we have provided.
I also understand that the committee intends to restrict this open discussion to certain specific activities and to avoid current foreign intelligence operations. It may not be possible to discuss all these activities completely without some risk of damage to continuing foreign intelligence capabilities. Therefore, I may request some aspects of our discussion be conducted in executive session where there can be opportunity to continue our full and frank disclosure to the committee of all the information you require. The committee may then develop an appropriate public statement. We are therefore here, sir, at your request, prepared to cooperate in bringing these matters before your committee.
In the interest of clarity and perspective, I shall first review the purpose of the National Security Agency and the authorities under which it operates. Next, I will describe the process by which requirements for information are levied on NSA by other Government agencies. And finally, I will give a more specific description of an operation conducted in 1967-73 in response to external requirements, which I will refer to as "the watch list activity." This activity
has been subject to an intensive review by this committee and staff in closed session.
Under the authority of the President, the Secretary of Defense has been delegated responsibility for both providing security of U.S. governmental communications and seeking intelligence from foreign electrical communications. Both functions are executed for the Secretary of Defense by the Director, National Security Agency, through a complex national system which includes the NSA as its nucleus. It is appropriate for the Secretary of Defense to have these executive agent responsibilities, since the great majority of the effort to accomplish both of these missions is applied to the support of the military aspects of the national security.
The communications security mission is directed at enhancing the security of U.S. Government communications whenever needed to protect those communications from exploitation by foreign governments -- a complex undertaking in today's advanced electronic world.
The United States, as part of its effort to produce foreign intelligence, has intercepted foreign communications, analyzed, and in some cases decoded these communications to produce such foreign intelligence since the Revolutionary War. During the Civil War and World War I these communications were often telegrams sent by wire. In modern times, with the advent of wireless communications, particular emphasis has been placed by the Government on the specialized field of intercepting and analyzing communications transmitted by radio. Since the 1930's, elements of the military establishment have been assigned tasks to obtain intelligence from foreign radio transmissions.
In the months preceding Pearl Harbor and throughout World War II, highly successful accomplishments were made by groups in the Army and the Navy to intercept and analyze Japanese and German coded radio messages. Admiral Nimitz is reported as rating its value in the Pacific to the equivalent of another whole fleet. According to another official report, in the victory in the Battle of Midway, it would have been impossible to have achieved the concentration of forces and the tactical surprise without communications intelligence. A congressional committee in its investigation of Pearl Harbor, stated that the success of communications intelligence "contributed enormously to the defeat of the enemy, greatly shortened the war, and saved many thousands of lives." General George C. Marshall commented that they-- communications intelligence -- had contributed "greatly to the victories and tremendously to the savings of American lives."
Following World War II, the separate military efforts were brought together and the National Security Agency was formed to focus the Government's efforts. The purpose was to maintain and improve this source of intelligence which was considered of vital importance to the national security, to our ability to wage war, and to the conduct foreign affairs.
This mission of NSA is directed to foreign intelligence, obtained from foreign electrical communications and also from other foreign signals such as radars. Signals are intercepted by many techniques and processed, sorted and analyzed by procedures which reject inappropriate or unnecessary signals. The foreign intelligence derived from these signals is then reported to various agencies of the Government in response to their approved requirements for foreign intelligence.
The NSA works very hard at this task and is composed of dedicated, patriotic citizens, civilian and military, most of whom have dedicated their professional careers to this important and rewarding job. They are justifiably proud of their service to their country and fully accept the fact that their combined remarkable efforts can be appreciated only by those few in Government who know of their great importance to the United States.
Congress, in 1933, recognized the importance of communications intelligence activities and acted to protect the sensitive nature of the information derived from those activities by passing legislation that is now 18 U.S.C. 952. This statute prohibits the divulging of the contents of decoded foreign diplomatic messages, or information about them.
Later, in 1950, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. 798, which prohibits the unauthorized disclosure, prejudicial use, or publication of classified information of the government concerning communications intelligence activities, cryptologic activities, or the results thereof. It indicates that the President is authorized: (1) to designate agencies to engage in communications intelligence activities for the United States; (2) to classify cryptologic documents and information; and (3) to determine those persons who shall be given access to sensitive cryptologic documents and information. Further, this law defines the term "communication intelligence" to mean all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients.
After an intensive review by a panel of distinguished citizens, President Truman in 1952 acted to reorganize and strengthen communications intelligence activities. He issued in October 1952 a Presidential memorandum outlining in detail how communications intelligence activities were to be conducted, designated the Secretary of Defense to be his executive agent in these matters, directed the establishment of the NSA, and outlined the missions and functions to be performed by the NSA.
The Secretary of Defense, pursuant to the congressional authority delegated to him in section 133(d) of title 10 of the United States Code, acted to establish the National Security Agency. The section of the law cited provides that the Secretary may exercise any of these duties through persons or organizations of the Department of Defense. In 1962 a Special Subcommittee on Defense Agencies of the House Armed Services Committee concluded, after examining the circumstances leading to the creation of defense agencies, that the Secretary of Defense had the legal authority to establish the National Security Agency.
The President's constitutional and statutory authorities to obtain foreign intelligence through signals intelligence are implemented through National Security Council and Director of Central Intelligence Directives which govern the conduct of signals intelligence activities by the executive branch of the Government.
In 1959, the Congress enacted Public Law 86-36 which provides authority to enable the NSA as the principal agency of the Government responsible for signals intelligence activities, to function without the disclosure of information which would endanger the accomplishment of its functions.
In 1964 Public Law 88-290 was enacted by the Congress to establish a personnel security system and procedures governing persons employed by the NSA or granted access to its sensitive cryptologic information. Public Law 88-290 also delegates authority to the Secretary of Defense to apply these personnel security procedures to employees and persons granted access to the National Security Agency's sensitive information. This law underscores the concern of the Congress regarding the extreme importance of our signals intelligence enterprise and mandates that the Secretary of Defense, and the Director, National Security Agency, take measures to achieve security for the activities of the NSA.
Title 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) provides as follows:
Nothing contained in this chapter or in Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 605, shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the nation against actual or potential attack; or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.
In United States v. Brown, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, decided August 22, 1973, the court discussed this provision of the law as follows:
The constitutional power of the President is adverted to, although not conferred by, Congress in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
While NSA does not look upon section 2511(3) as authority to conduct communications intelligence, it is our position that nothing in chapter 119 of title 18 affects or governs the conduct of communications intelligence for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence.
Finally, for the past 29 years, Congress has annually appropriated funds for the operation of the NSA, following hearings before the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress in which extensive briefings of the NSA's signals intelligence mission have been conducted. We appear before both the House and the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees to discuss and report on the U.S. signals intelligence and communications security programs, and to justify the budgetary requirements associated with these programs. We do this in formal executive session, in which we discuss our activities in whatever detail required by the Congress.
In considering the fiscal year 1976 total cryptologic budget now before Congress, I appeared before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on two separate occasions for approximately 7 hours. In addition, I provided follow-up response to over 100 questions of the subcommittee members and staff. We also appeared before armed services subcommittees concerned with authorizing research, development, test and evaluation, construction and housing programs and also before the appropriations subcommittees on construction and housing.
In addition to this testimony, congressional oversight is accomplished in other ways. Staff members of these subcommittees have periodically visited the Agency for detailed briefings on specific aspects of our operations. Members of investigations staff of the House Appropriations Committee recently conducted an extensive investigation
of this Agency. The results of this study, which lasted over a year, have been provided to that committee in a detailed report. Another feature of congressional review is that since 1955 resident auditors of the General Accounting Office have been assigned at the Agency to perform on-site audits. Additional GAO auditors were cleared for access in 1973 and GAO, in addition to this audit, is initiating a classified review of our automatic data processing functions. NSA's cooperative efforts in this area were noted by a Senator in February of this year. In addition, resident auditors of the Office of Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, conduct indepth management reviews of our organization.
A particular aspect of NSA authorities which is pertinent to today's discussion relates to the definition of foreign communications. Neither the Presidential directive of 1952 nor the National Security Council directive No. 6 defines the term foreign communications. The NSA has always confined its activities to communications involving at least one foreign terminal. This interpretation is consistent with the definition of foreign communications in the Communications Act of 1934.
There is also a directive of the Director of Central Intelligence dealing with security regulations which employs a definition which excludes communications between U.S. citizens or entities. While this directive has not been construed as defining the NSA mission in the same sense as has the National Security Council directive, in the past this exclusion has usually been applied and is applied now. However, we will describe a particular activity in the past when that exclusion was not applied.
NSA does not now, and with an exception to be described has not in the past conducted intercept operations for the purpose of obtaining the communications of U.S. citizens. However, it necessarily occurs that some circuits which are known to carry foreign communications necessary for foreign intelligence will also carry personal communications between U.S. citizens, one of whom is at a foreign location.
The interception of communications, however it may occur, is conducted in such a manner as to minimize the unwanted messages. Nevertheless, many unwanted communications are potentially available for selection. Subsequent processing, sorting, and selecting for analysis is conducted in accordance with strict procedures to insure immediate and, wherever possible, automatic rejection of inappropriate messages. The analysis and reporting is accomplished only for those messages which meet specified conditions and requirements for foreign intelligence. It is certainly believed by NSA that our communications intelligence activities are solely for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence in accordance with the authorities delegated by the President stemming from his constitutional power to conduct foreign intelligence.
NSA produces signals intelligence in response to objectives, requirements and priorities as expressed by the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice of the U.S. Intelligence Board. There is a separate committee of the Board which develops the particular requirements against which the NSA is expected to respond.
The principal mechanism used by the Board in formulating requirements for signals intelligence information has been one of listing areas of intelligence interest and specifying in some detail the signals intelligence
needed by the various elements of Government. This listing, which was begun in 1966 and fully implemented in 1970, is intended to provide guidance to the Director of the National Security Agency, and to the Secretary of Defense, for programing and operating NSA activities. It is intended as an expression of realistic and essential requirements for signals intelligence information.
This process recognizes that a single listing, updated annually, needs to be supplemented with additional detail and time-sensitive factors, and it establishes a procedure whereby the USIB agencies can express directly to the NSA information needs which reasonably amplify requirements approved by USIB or higher authority.
In addition, there are established procedures for non-Board members, the Secret Service, and the BNDD at the time in question, to ask the NSA for information. The NSA does have operational discretion in responding to requirements, but we do not generate our own requirements for foreign intelligence. The Director, NSA is directed to be responsive to the requirements formulated by the Director of Central Intelligence. However, I clearly must not respond to any requirements which I feel are not proper.
In 1975 the USIB signals intelligence requirements process was revised. Under the new system, all basic requirements for signals intelligence information on U.S. Government agencies will be reviewed and validated by the Signals Intelligence Committee of USIB before being levied on the NSA. An exception is those requirements which are highly time-sensitive; they will continue to be passed simultaneously to us for action and to USIB for information. The new system will also attempt to prioritize signals intelligence requirements. The new requirements process is an improvement in that it creates a formal mechanism to record all requirements for signals intelligence information and to establish their relative priorities.
Now to the subject which the committee asked me to address in some detail -- the so-called watch list activity of 1967 to 1973.
The use of lists of words, including individual names, subjects, locations, et cetera, has long been one of the methods used to sort out information of foreign intelligence value from that which is not of interest. In the past such lists have been referred to occasionally as watch lists, because the lists were used as an aid to watch for foreign activity of reportable intelligence. interest. However, these lists generally did not contain names of U.S. citizens or organizations. The activity in question is one in which U.S. names were used systematically as a basis for selecting messages, including some between U.S. citizens, when one of the communicants was at a foreign location.
The origin of such activity is unclear. During the early sixties, requesting agencies had asked the NSA to look for reflections in international communications of certain U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba. Beginning in 1967, requesting agencies provided names of persons and organizations, some of whom were U.S. citizens, to the NSA in an effort to obtain information which was available in foreign communications as a by-product of our normal foreign intelligence mission.
The purpose of the lists varied, but all possessed a common thread in which the NSA was requested to review information available through our usual intercept sources. The initial purpose was to help determine the existence of foreign influence on specified activities of
interest to agencies of the U.S. Government, with emphasis then on Presidential protection and on civil disturbances occurring throughout the Nation.
Later, because of other developments, such as widespread national concern over such criminal activity as drug trafficking and acts of terrorism, both domestic and international, the emphasis came to include these areas. Thus, during this period, 1967-73, requirements for which lists were developed in four basic areas: international drug trafficking; Presidential protection; acts of terrorism; and possible foreign support or influence on civil disturbances.
In the sixties there was Presidential concern voiced over the massive flow of drugs into our country from outside the United States. Early in President Nixon's administration, he instructed the CIA to pursue with vigor intelligence efforts to identify foreign sources of drugs and the foreign organizations and methods used to introduce illicit drugs into the United States. The BNDD, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in 1970 asked the NSA to provide communications intelligence relevant to these foreign aspects, and BNDD provided watch lists with some U.S. names [exhibit 4].1 International drug trafficking requirements were formally documented in USIB requirements in August 1971.
As we all know, during this period there was also heightened concern by the country and the Secret Service over Presidential protection because of President Kennedy's assassination. After the Warren Report, requirements lists containing names of U.S. citizens and organizations were provided to NSA by the Secret Service in support of their efforts to protect the President and other senior officials. Such requirements were later incorporated into USIB documentation. At that time, intelligence derived from foreign communications was regarded as a valuable tool in support of Executive protection.
About the same time as the concern over drugs, or shortly thereafter, there was a committee established by the President to combat international terrorism. This committee was supported by an interdepartmental working group with USIB representatives. Requirements to support this effort with communications intelligence were also incorporated into USIB documentation.
Now let me put the watch list in perspective regarding its size and the numbers of names submitted by the various agencies:
The BNDD submitted a watch list covering their requirements for intelligence on international narcotics trafficking. On September 8, 1972, President Nixon summarized the efforts of his administration against drug abuse. The President stated that he ordered the Central Intelligence Agency, early in his administration, to mobilize its full resources to fight the international drug trade. The key priority, the President noted, was to destroy the trafficking through law enforcement and intelligence efforts. The BNDD list contained the names of suspected drug traffickers. There were about 450 U.S. individuals and over 3,000 foreign individuals.
The Secret Service submitted watch lists covering their requirements for inteLligence relating to Presidential and Executive protection.
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1 See p. 151.
Public Law 90-331 of June 6, 1968, made it mandatory for Federal agencies to assist the Secret Service in the performance of its protective duties. These lists contained names of persons and groups who, in the opinion of the Secret Service, were potentially a threat to Secret Service protectees, as well as the names of the protectees themselves. On these lists were about 180 U.S. individuals and groups and about 525 foreign individuals and groups.
The Brownell Committee, whose report led to the creation of NSA stated that communications intelligence should be provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation because of the essential role of the Bureau in the national security.
The FBI submitted watch lists concerning their requirements of foreign ties and support to certain U.S. persons and groups. These lists contained names of "so-called" extremist persons and groups individuals and groups active in civil disturbances, and terrorists. The lists contained a maximum of about 1,000 U.S. persons and groups and about 1,700 foreign persons and groups.
[JYA Note: See omitted CIA note here in Allen's prepared statement.]
The DIA submitted a watch list covering their requirements on possible foreign control of, or influence on, U.S. antiwar activity. The list contained names of individuals traveling to North Vietnam. There were about 20 U.S. individuals on this list. DIA is responsible under DOD directives for satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major components of the DOD and to validate and assign to NSA requirements for intelligence required by DOD components.
Between 1967 and 1973 there was a cumulative total of about 450 U.S. names on the narcotics list, and about 1,200 U.S. names on all other lists combined. What that amounted to was that at the height of the watch list activity, there were about 800 U.S. names on the watch list and about one-third of these 800 were from the narcotics list.
We estimate that over this 6-year period, 1967-1973, about 2,000 reports were issued by the NSA on international narcotics trafficking and about 1,900 reports were issued covering the three areas of terrorism, Executive protection and foreign influence over U.S. groups. This would average about two reports per day. These reports included some messages between U.S. citizens with one foreign communicant, but over 90 percent had at least one foreign communicant and all messages had at least one foreign terminal. Using agencies did periodically review, and were asked by the NSA to review, their watch lists to insure inappropriate or unnecessary entries were promptly removed.
I am not the proper person to ask concerning the value of the product from these four special efforts. We are aware that a major terrorist
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1 See p. 145.
2 See p. 147.
act in the United States was prevented. In addition, some large drug shipments were prevented from entering the United States because of our efforts on international narcotics trafficking. We have statements from the requesting agencies in which they have expressed appreciation for the value of the information which they had received from us. Nonetheless, in my own judgment, the controls which were placed on the handling of the intelligence were so restrictive that the value was significantly diminished.
Now let me address the question of the watch list activity as the NSA saw it at the time.
This activity was reviewed by proper authority within NSA and by competent external authority. This included two former Attorneys General and a former Secretary of Defense.
The requirements for information had been approved by officials of the using agencies and subsequently validated by the United States Intelligence Board. For example, the Secret Service and BNDD requirements were formally included in USIB guidance in 1970 and 1971, respectively.
In the areas of narcotics trafficking, terrorism and requirements related to the protection of the lives of senior U.S. officials, the emphasis placed by the President on a strong, coordinated government effort was clearly understood. There also was no question that there was considerable Presidential concern and interest in determining the existence and extent of foreign support to groups fomenting civil disturbances in the United States.
From 1967 to 1969 the procedure for submitting names was more informal, with written requests following as the usual practice. Starting in 1969 the procedure was formalized and the names for watch lists were submitted through channels in writing [exhibit 3].1 The Director and Deputy Director of the NSA approved certain categories of subject matter from customer agencies. and were aware that U.S. individuals and organizations were being included on watch lists. While they did not review and approve each individual name there were continuing management reviews at levels below the Directorate.
NSA personnel sometimes made analytic amplifications on customer watch list submissions in order to fulfill certain requirements. For example, when information was received that a name on the watch list used an alias, the alias was inserted; or when an address was uncovered of a watch list name, the address was included. This practice by analysts was done to enhance the selection process, not to expand the lists.
The information produced by the watch list activity was, with one exception, entirely a byproduct of our foreign intelligence mission. All collection was conducted against international communications with at least one terminal in a foreign country, and for purposes unrelated to the watch list activity. That is, the communications were obtained, for example, by monitoring communications to and from Hanoi.
All communications had a foreign terminal and the foreign terminal or communicant, with the one exception to be described, was the initial object of the communications collection.
The watch list activity specifically consisted of scanning international communications already intercepted for other purposes to derive
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1 See p. 149.
information which met watch list requirements. This scanning was accomplished by using the entries provided to NSA as selection criteria. Once selected, the messages were analyzed to determine if the information therein met those requesting agencies' requirements a
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