Tuesday, September 24, 2013
Is Equal Opportunity Just a Myth?
Saturday, June 1, 2013
Cyber-Scare
Cyber-Scare
bostonreview.netThe age of cyber-warfare has arrived. That, at any rate, is the message we are now hearing from a broad range of journalists, policy analysts, and government officials. Introducing a comprehensive White House report on cyber-security released at the end of May, President Obama called cyber-security “one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation.” His words echo a flurry of gloomy think-tank reports. The Defense Science Board, a federal advisory group, recently warned that “cyber-warfare is here to stay,” and that it will “encompass not only military attacks but also civilian commercial systems.” And “Securing Cyberspace for the 44th President,” prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, suggests that cyber-security is as great a concern as “weapons of mass destruction or global jihad.”
Unfortunately, these reports are usually richer in vivid metaphor—with fears of “digital Pearl Harbors” and “cyber-Katrinas”—than in factual foundation.
Consider a frequently quoted CIA claim about using the Internet to cause widespread power outages. It derives from a public presentation by a senior CIA cyber-security analyst in early 2008. Here is what he said:
We have information, from multiple regions outside the United States, of cyber-intrusions into utilities, followed by extortion demands. We suspect, but cannot confirm, that some of these attackers had the benefit of inside knowledge. We have information that cyber-attacks have been used to disrupt power equipment in several regions outside the United States. In at least one case, the disruption caused a power outage affecting multiple cities. We do not know who executed these attacks or why, but all involved intrusions through the Internet.
So “there is information” that cyber-attacks “ have been used.” When? Why? By whom? And have the attacks caused any power outages? The CIA may have some classified information, but very little that is unclassified suggests that such cyber-intrusions have occurred.
Or consider an April 2009 Wall Street Journal article entitled “Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies.” The article quotes no attributable sources for its starkest claims about cyber-spying, names no utility companies as victims of intrusions, and mentions just one real cyber-attack, which occurred in Australia in 2000 and was conducted by a disgruntled employee rather than an external hacker.
It is alarming that so many people have accepted the White House’s assertions about cyber-security as a key national security problem without demanding further evidence. Have we learned nothing from the WMD debacle? The administration’s claims could lead to policies with serious, long-term, troubling consequences for network openness and personal privacy.
Cyber-security fears have had, it should be said, one unambiguous effect: they have fueled a growing cyber-security market, which, according to some projections, will grow twice as fast as the rest of the IT industry. Boeing, Raytheon, and Lockheed Martin, among others, have formed new business units to tap increased spending to protect U.S. government computers from cyber-attacks. Moreover, many former government officials have made smooth transitions from national cyber-security policy to the lucrative worlds of consulting and punditry. Speaking at a recent conference in Washington, D.C., Amit Yoran—a former cyber-security czar in the Bush administration and currently the C.E.O. of NetWitness, a cyber-security start-up—has called hacking a national security threat, adding that “cyber-9/11 has happened over the last ten years, but it’s happened slowly, so we don’t see it.” One way for the government to protect itself from this cyber-9/11 may be to purchase NetWitness’s numerous software applications, aimed at addressing both “state and non-state sponsored cyber threats.”
From a national security perspective, cyber-attacks matter in two ways. First, because the back-end infrastructure underlying our economy (national and global) is now digitized, it is subject to new risks. Fifty years ago it would have been hard—perhaps impossible, short of nuclear attack—to destroy a significant chunk of the U.S. economy in a matter of seconds; today all it takes is figuring out a way to briefly disable the computer systems that run Visa, MasterCard, and American Express. Fortunately, such massive disruption is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Of course there is already plenty of petty cyber-crime, some of it involving stolen credit card numbers. Much of it, however, is due to low cyber-security awareness by end-users (you and me), rather than banks or credit card companies.
Second, a great deal of internal government communication flows across computer networks, and hostile and not-so-hostile parties are understandably interested in what is being said. Moreover, data that are just sitting on one’s computer are fair game, too, as long as the computer has a network connection or a USB port. Despite the “cyber” prefix, however, the basic risks are strikingly similar to those of the analog age. Espionage has been around for centuries, and there is very little we can do to protect ourselves beyond using stronger encryption techniques and exercising more caution in our choices of passwords and Wi-Fi connections.
To be sure, there is a war-related caveat here: if the military relies on its own email system or other internal electronic communications, it is essential to preserve this capability in wartime. Once more, however, the concern is not entirely novel; when radio was the primary means of communication, radio-jamming was also a serious military concern; worries about radio go back as far as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
The ultimate doomsday scenario—think Live Free or Die Hard—could involve a simultaneous attack on economic e-infrastructure and e-communications: imagine al Qaeda disabling banks, destroying financial data, disrupting networks, and driving the American economy back to the nineteenth century. This certainly sounds scary—almost as scary as raptors in Central Park or a giant asteroid heading toward the White House. The latter two are not, however, being presented as “national security risks” yet.
There are certainly genuine security concerns associated with the Internet. But before accepting the demands of government agencies for new and increased powers to fight threats in cyberspace and prepare for cyber-warfare, we should look more closely at well-defined dangers and ask just where existing technological means and legal norms fall short. Because the technologies are changing so quickly, we cannot expect definitive answers. But cyber-skeptics—who argue that cyber-warfare is still more of an urban legend than a credible hazard—appear to be onto something important.
One kind of cyber-security problem grows out of resource scarcity. A network has only so much bandwidth; a server can serve only so much data at one time. So if you want to disable (or simply slow down) the computer backbone of a national economy, for example, you need to figure out how to reach its upper limit.
It would be relatively easy to protect against this problem if you could cut your computer or network off from the rest of the world. But as the majority of governmental and commercial services have moved online, we expect them to be offered anywhere; Americans still want to access their online banking accounts at Chase even if they are travelling in Africa or Asia. What this means in practice is that institutions typically cannot shut off access to their online services based on nationality of the user or the origin of the computer (and in the case of news or entertainment sites, they do not want to: greater access means more advertising income).
Together, these limitations create an opportunity for attackers. Since no one, not even the U.S. government, has infinite computer resources, any network is potentially at risk.
Taking advantage of this resource scarcity could be an effective way of causing trouble for sites one does not like. The simplest—and also the least effective—way of doing this is to visit the URL and hit the “reload” button on your browser as often (and for as long) as you can. Congratulations: you have just participated in the most basic kind of “denial-of-service” (DoS) attack, which aims to deny or delay the delivery of online services to legitimate users. These days, however, it would be very hard to find a site that would suffer any noticeable damage from such a nuisance; what is missing from your cyber-guerilla campaign is scale.
Now multiply your efforts by a million—distribute your attacks among millions of other computers—and this could be enough to cause headaches to the administrators of many Web sites. These types of attacks are known as “distributed denial-of-service” or DDoS attacks. Administrators may be able to increase their traffic and bandwidth estimates and allocate more resources. Otherwise they have to live with this harassment, which may disable their Web site for long periods.
DDoS attacks work, then, by making heavier-than-normal demands on the underlying infrastructure, and they usually cause inconvenience rather than serious harm. Not sure how to do it yourself? No problem: you can buy a DDoS attack on the black market. Try eBay.
In fact, your own computer may well be participating in a DDoS attack right now. You may, for example, have inadvertently downloaded a trojan—a hard-to-detect, tiny piece of software—that has allowed someone else to take control of your machine, without obvious effect on your computer’s speed or operations. Some computer experts put the upper limit of infected computers as high as a quarter of all computers connected to the Internet.
Because a single computer is inconsequential, the infected computers form “botnets”—nets of robots—that can receive directions from a command-and-control center—usually just another computer on the network with the power to give commands. What makes the latest generation of botnets hard to defeat is that every infected computer can assume the role of the command-and-control center: old-fashioned methods of decapitation do not work against such dispersed command-and-control. Moreover, botnets are strategic: when network administrators try to block the attacks, botnets can shift to unprotected prey. Commercial cyber-security firms are trying to keep up with the changing threats; thus far, however, the botnets are staying at least one step ahead.
DDoS threats have been far more commercial than political. The driving force has been cyber-gangs (many of them based in the former Soviet Union and Southeast Asia) which are in the extortion business. They find a profitable Internet business that cannot afford downtime and threaten to take down its Web site(s) with DDoS attacks. The online gambling industry—by some estimates, a $15-billion-a-year business—is a particularly appealing target because it is illegal in the United States: it cannot seek protection and take advantage of robust U.S. communications infrastructure. Thus, administrators of popular gambling sites commonly receive threats of DDoS attacks and demands for $40,000-$60,000 to “protect” the sites from attacks during peak betting periods (say, before big sporting events such as the Super Bowl). Many legitimate businesses fall victim to cyber-extortion, too. Since it is better to dole out a little cash to stop future attacks than to deal with the PR fallout—and possible drop in stock prices—that usually follows cyber-attacks, cyber-crime is underreported and underprosecuted.
Another commercial opportunity for cyber-gangs is the creation of a large army of for-hire botnets, with extremely powerful attack capabilities. It is currently quite straightforward to rent the destructive services of a botnet ($1000/day is a going rate). The point was made forcefully by a controversial recent experiment: a group of BBC reporters purchased the services of a botnet 22,000 infected-computers strong from a vendor of cyber-crime services and used it to attack the site of a cyber-security company.
The commercial availability of DDoS-attack capability has generated excitement about political applications. The risks to online freedom of expression may be considerable: saying anything controversial may trigger a wave of cyber-attacks that your adversaries can purchase easily. These attacks are financially burdensome and politically disabling for the victim. Getting your server back online is usually the least of your problems. Your Web hosting company may kick you off its servers because the cost of dealing with the damage caused by cyber-attacks usually outweighs the monetary gains of hosting controversial groups, from political bloggers to LGBT groups to exiled media from countries such as Burma (just to mention some recent victims of DDoS attacks). Protection from DDoS is available, but usually too expensive for nonprofits.
An alternative to expensive DDoS protection is a kind of distributed defense network. Imagine an idealized world in which every computer has the latest anti-virus update and where users do not open suspicious attachments or visit dubious Web sites. Cyber-gangs would then be left to their own devices—to attacking with computers they own—and the security issues would be considerably diminished. This perfect world is impossible to achieve, but the right policies could get us pretty close. One option is to go “macro”—to ensure that all critical national infrastructure is prioritized and protected, with extremely flexible resource allocation for the key assets (part of the job of a cyber-czar). This, however, would do little to curb the DDoS market. Indeed, it might embolden the attackers to ratchet up their capabilities. An alternative is to go “micro”—ensure that people who are responsible for the creation of this market in DDoS attacks in the first place (i.e., you and me) are knowledgeable (or at least literate) in cyber-security matters and do not surf with their antivirus protection turned off. This latter solution could eliminate the problem at root: if all computers were secure and computer users careful, botnets would significantly shrink in size. This, however, is a big “if,” and most skepticism over whether the federal government is well-placed to educate about these threats is justified.
The security threats from DDoS attacks pale in comparison with the potentialconsequences of another kind of online insecurity, one more likely to be associated with terrorists than criminals and potentially more consequential politically: data breaches or network security compromises (I say “potential” because very few analysts with access to intelligence information agree to speak on the record). After all, with DDoS, attackers simply slow down everyone’saccess to data that are, in most cases, already public (some data are occasionally destroyed). With data breaches, in contrast, attackers can gain access to private and classified data, and with network security compromises, they might also obtain full control of high-value services like civil-aviation communication systems or nuclear reactors.
Data breaches and network security compromises also create far more exciting popular narratives: the media frenzy that followed the detection of China-based GhostNet—a large cyber-spying operation that spanned more than 1250 computers in 103 countries, many of them belonging to governments, militaries, and international organizations—is illustrative. Much like botnets, cyber-spying operations such as GhostNet rely on inadvertently downloaded trojans to obtain full control over the infected computer. In GhostNet’s case, hackers even gained the ability to turn on computers’ camera and audio-recording functions for the purposes of remote surveillance, though we have no evidence that attackers used this function.
In fact, what may be most remarkable about GhostNet is what did not happen. No computers belonging to the U.S. or U.K. governments—both deeply concerned about cyber-security—were affected; one NATO computer was affected, but had no classified information on it. It might be unnerving that the computers in the foreign ministries of Brunei, Barbados, and Bhutan were compromised, but the cyber-security standards and procedures of those countries probably are not at the global cutting edge. With some assistance on upgrades, they could be made much more secure.
In part, then, the solution to cyber-insecurity is simple: if you have a lot of classified information on a computer and do not want to become part of another GhostNet-like operation, do not connect it to the Internet. This is by far the safest way to preserve the integrity of your data. Of course, it may be impossible to keep your computer disconnected from all networks. And by connecting to virtually any network—no matter how secure—you relinquish sole control over your computer. In most cases, however, this is a tolerable risk: on average, you are better off connected, and you can guard certain portions of a network, while leaving others exposed. This is Network Security 101, and high-value networks are built by very smart IT experts. Moreover, most really sensitive networks are designed in ways that prevent third-party visitors—even if they manage somehow to penetrate the system—from doing much damage. For example, hackers who invade the email system of a nuclear reactor will not be able to blow up nuclear facilities with a mouse click. Data and security breaches vary in degree, but such subtlety is usually lost on decision-makers and journalists alike.
Hype aside, what we do know is that there are countless attacks on the government computers in virtually every major Western country, many of them for the purpose of espionage and intelligence gathering; data have been lost, compromised, and altered. The United States may have been affected the most: the State Department estimates that it has lost “terabytes” of data to cyber-attacks, while Pentagon press releases suggest that it is under virtually constant cyber-siege. Dangerous as they are, these are still disturbing incidents of data loss rather than seriously breached data or compromised networks. Breakthroughs in encryption techniques have also made data more secure than ever. As for the data loss, the best strategy is to follow some obvious rules: be careful, and avoid trafficking data in open spaces. (Don’t put important data anywhere on the Internet, and don’t leave laptops with classified information in hotel rooms.)
Although there is a continuous spectrum of attacks, running from classified memos to nuclear buttons, we have seen no evidence that access to the latter is very likely or even possible. Vigilance is vital, but exaggeration and blind acceptance of speculative assertions are not.
So why is there so much concern about “cyber-terrorism”? Answering a question with a question: who frames the debate? Much of the data are gathered by ultra-secretive government agencies—which need to justify their own existence—and cyber-security companies—which derive commercial benefits from popular anxiety. Journalists do not help. Gloomy scenarios and speculations about cyber-Armaggedon draw attention, even if they are relatively short on facts.
Politicians, too, deserve some blame, as they are usually quick to draw parallels between cyber-terrorism and conventional terrorism—often for geopolitical convenience—while glossing over the vast differences that make military metaphors inappropriate. In particular, cyber-terrorism is anonymous, decentralized, and even more detached than ordinary terrorism from physical locations. Cyber-terrorists do not need to hide in caves or failed states; “cyber-squads” typically reside in multiple geographic locations, which tend to be urban and well-connected to the global communications grid. Some might still argue that state sponsorship (or mere toleration) of cyber-terrorism could be treated as casus belli, but we are yet to see a significant instance of cyber-terrorists colluding with governments. All of this makes talk of large-scale retaliation impractical, if not irresponsible, but also understandable if one is trying to attract attention.
Much of the cyber-security problem, then, seems to be exaggerated: the economy is not about to be brought down, data and networks can be secured, and terrorists do not have the upper hand. But what about genuine cyber-warfare? The cyber-attacks on Estonia in April-May 2007 (triggered by squabbling between Tallinn and Moscow over the relocation of a Soviet-era monument) and the cyber-dimension of the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia have reignited older debates about how cyber-attacks could be used by and against governments.
The Estonian case is notable for the duration of the attacks—the country was under “DDoS-terror” for almost a month, with much of its crucial national infrastructure (including online banking) temporarily unavailable. The local media and some Estonian politicians were quick to blame the attacks on Russia, but no conclusive evidence emerged to prove this. The Georgian case—widely discussed as the first major instance of cyber-attacks (primarily DDoS) accompanying conventional warfare—has barely lived up to its hype. Many Georgian government Web sites were, in fact, targets of severe DDoS attacks. So was at least one bank. Yet, the broader strategic importance of such attacks within the Russian military operation is not clear at all, nor did Russia acknowledge responsibility for the attacks.
Although the attacks on Estonia and Georgia are often grouped together—perhaps because of the tentative Russian involvement in both—they are also very different. One important difference is in the degree of technological sophistication of the two countries. Attacking the Internet in Estonia, which made Internet access a basic human right in 2000, is like attacking the banks in Lichtenstein: the country’s economy, politics, and even some emergency services are pegged to it so tightly that being offline is a national calamity.
Georgia, on the other hand, is a technological laggard. When Georgia’s major government Web sites became inaccessible during the war, the Foreign Ministry was slow in finding a temporary home on a blog. The lapse may have gone largely unnoticed: 2006 Internet statistics gathered by the United Nations show that Georgia had about seven Internet users per one hundred population compared to 55 in Estonia and 70 in the United States. The Georgian case also highlights the danger of drawing too many strategic lessons from cyber-attacks. After all, one common result of the loss of Internet access is power outages, common during wartime regardless of cyber-attacks.
Moreover, both Georgia and Estonia are in a sense “cyber-locked,” with limited points of connection (even in Estonia) to the external Internet. This limited connectivity and the two countries dependence on physical infrastructure heighten their vulnerability. Less cyber-locked nations do not face the same risk. As Scott Pinzon, former Information Security Analyst with WatchGuard Technologies, told me, “If Georgia or Estonia were enmeshed into the Internet as thoroughly as, say, the State of California, the cyber-attacks against them would have been reduced to the level of nuisance.” The smartest way to guard against future attacks may, then, be to build robust infrastructure—laying extra cables, creating more Internet exchange points (where Internet service providers share data), providing incentives for new Internet service providers, and attracting more players to sell connectivity in places that now have limited infrastructure. The United States has actually done quite a bit of this already, so the Estonian experience may have little to teach Americans. While it might benefit Estonia and some other countries to invest heavily in upgrades, the United States may be able to forego dramatic and costly changes in favor of regular maintenance and incremental improvements.
Quite apart from the technological issues of cyber-warfare, there is the question of what even constitutes cyber-war. How do existing legal categories apply in this new setting?
For largely geopolitical reasons, Estonia initially called the cyber-attacks a cyber-war, a move that now seems ill-considered (on a recent trip to Estonia, I noticed that Estonian officials had replaced the term “cyber-war” with the more neutral “cyber-attacks”). The militarization of cyberspace that inevitably comes with any talk of war is disturbing, for there is no evidence yet to link the current generation of cyber-attacks to warfare, at least not in the legal sense of the term. However, the attacks on Estonia and Georgia did each pose an intriguing legal question, and neither has yet been answered definitively. First, do cyber-attacks constitute a “use of armed force” as understood by international law (the Estonian case)? Second, what kind of cyber-attacks are allowed under the laws of war once the conflict has already begun (the Georgian case)?
The first question is the trickiest. Commenting on the attacks, the Estonian defense minister said “such sabotage cannot be treated as hooliganism, but has to be treated as an attack against the state.” But did the cyber-attacks constitute the beginning of an armed conflict, as understood by the Geneva Conventions or Article 51 of the United Nations Charter? If the cyber-attacks constituted an armed attack, Estonia’s NATO allies should have followed Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which treats an attack against one member state as an attack against all and calls for collective defense. NATO only sent a team of experts to assess the damage. Using the metrics of conventional conflicts to assess the severity of these attacks is not easy. How intense and severe must the damage be in order for the cyber-attacks to qualify as armed attacks? Does damage in cyberspace qualify, even in the absence of offline damage? Is inconvenience to Internet users enough? What about the duration of the attacks?
However such questions are answered, the aggrieved party would still have to prove that a cyber-attack was state-sponsored, and it is unclear how one makes this argument in a legally convincing fashion. Are states only responsible for actions they directly control? Are they also responsible for all cyber-activity in their territory? And how far does that responsibility extend? At least one computer with an IP address belonging to the Russian government was identified as part of a botnet used in the Estonian attacks, but it is hard to build a case for Russian government responsibility on that IP address alone, since there were thousands of other participating computers.
If state involvement cannot be proven beyond doubt, cyber-attacks should be treated as crimes and dealt with under national and, in some cases, international criminal law. But there are difficulties on this front as well. For example, unlike Estonia and many countries, Russia has never signed the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, which is the first international treaty seeking to harmonize national laws and facilitate cross-border cooperation among states on issues of cyber-crime. This makes it impossible to hold Russia to the standards envisioned in the Convention, and international law also provides few mechanisms for punishment.
The second question—what kinds of attacks would be allowed under the law of armed conflict?—presents another theoretical challenge, though for now at least, existing legal standards may suffice to address the issues.
Common sense dictates that the severity and targets of such attacks should be guided by international law, particularly the Geneva Conventions and associated protocols. Broadly speaking, current norms state that the conduct of war must meet three fundamental standards: belligerents must distinguish military from civilian objects when selecting targets; balance military necessity with humanitarian concern (the choice of weapons is not unlimited and must be made with the avoidance of unnecessary suffering in mind); and shun the use of force that is disproportionate, in the sense that it shows insufficient attention to the unnecessary suffering that might result. These principles have proved very hard, but not impossible, to interpret in conventional conflict; applying them to cyberspace is not an insurmountable challenge.
The careful application of these three principles to the conduct of war could explain why militaries might shy away from cyber-attacks. First, it is hard to predict the consequences of such attacks; cyber-attacks typically lack surgical precision and are notorious for side effects—a virus planted in a military network could easily spread to civilian computers, causing much unanticipated collateral damage.
Second, precisely targeted cyber-attacks could be a more humane way of conducting warfare. Instead of bombing a military train depot, with collateral civilian deaths, one can temporarily disable it by hacking into its dispatch system. However, the rules of war also stipulate that once a belligerent has used a more humane weapon, it ought to use that weapon in similar situations—and who would voluntarily abandon tanks in favor of computers only?
Third, most cyber-attacks are hard to justify in strategic terms and therefore would open associated personnel to prosecution for war crimes. For example, if there is little to be gained from attacking a poorly maintained Web site of the Georgian parliament, Russia could not justify an attack on it in military terms. If it went ahead with such an attack, its commanders woul risk prosecution for a disproportionate use of force.
The Internet does create one complexity worth considering in the context of applying existing laws of war: civilians on both sides can now participate in hostilities remotely. At the height of the war with Georgia, Russian blogs were full of detailed instructions on how to enlist in the cyber-war effort. Currently, humans are of little value in this process: a conventional botnet attack is more damaging. Yet, it is possible that human-powered botnets—or “meatbots”—could soon play a more serious role. Would participants then be liable for war crimes for their actions as civilians, who, unlike combatants, do not enjoy immunity under the law of war for their participation in hostilities? Would such civilian actions fall under the category of “direct participation in hostilities,” outlined in Commentary to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (“Direct participation in hostilities implies a direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and the place where the activity takes place”)? We may need a special clarification of this concept for cyberspace, but other metrics—the damage caused, the targets chosen, and so forth—could still apply.
The legal options are also complicated in the case of classical rather than meatbot-powered DDoS attacks because there are often at least five parties to it: attackers, computer users whose machines are enlisted by the attackers, target Internet sites, software vendors responsible for the exploited security vulnerabilities, and various Internet service providers who deliver the attack traffic. These parties have different degrees of responsibility, and some of them are liable for negligence, itself a murky legal area.
Putting these complexities aside and focusing just on states, it is important to bear in mind that the cyber-attacks on Estonia and especially Georgia did little damage, particularly when compared to the physical destruction caused by angry mobs in the former and troops in the latter. One argument about the Georgian case is that cyber-attacks played a strategic role by thwarting Georgia’s ability to communicate with the rest of the world and present its case to the international community. This argument both overestimates the Georgian government’s reliance on the Internet and underestimates how much international PR—particularly during wartime—is done by lobbyists and publicity firms based in Washington, Brussels, and London. There is, probably, an argument to be made about the vast psychological effects of cyber-attacks—particularly those that disrupt ordinary economic life. But there is a line between causing inconvenience and causing human suffering, and cyber-attacks have not crossed it yet.
The usefulness of cyber-attacks as a military tool is also contested. Some experts are justifiably skeptical about the arrival of a new age of cyber-war. Marcus J. Ranum, Chief Security Officer of Tenable Network Security, argues that it is pointless for superpowers to develop cyber-war capabilities to attack non-superpowers, as they can crush them in more conventional ways. As for non-superpowers, their use of cyber-capabilities would almost certainly result in what Ranum calls “the Blind Mike Tyson” effect: the superpower would retaliate with offline weaponry (“blind me, I nuke you”). If Ranum is right, we should forget about the prospect of all-out cyber-war until we have technologically advanced superpowers that are hostile to each other. Focusing on cyber-crime, cyber-terrorism, and cyber-espionage may help us address the more pertinent threats in a more rational manner.
In the meantime, those truly concerned about the future of the Internet, global security, and e-Katrinas would be advised to watch a recent South Park episode, in which the Internet suddenly disappears and hordes of obsessed families head to the Internet Refugee Camp in California, where they are allowed to browse their favorite Web sites for 40 seconds a day, while the military fights the no-longer-blinking giant Internet router. Finally, a nine-year-old boy plugs the router back in, and its magic green light returns. This would make a sensible strategy for many governments, which are all-too eager to adopt militaristic postures instead of focusing on making their own Internet infrastructures more robust.
Saturday, December 8, 2012
What you need to know about Health Law & Policy by Elyssa Durant, Ed.M. © 1995-2012
PSA HAVE A HEART || What you need to know about Health Law & Policy by Elyssa Durant, Ed.M. via @ELyssaD
PSA: @ELyssaD Responds: Petition @Penn to reconsider Paul Corby, 23 year old with autism denied transplant © 2012
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Abstract
This paper will discuss the major historical efforts to legislate organ transplantation in the United States. In addition to discussing the problems found within the current system of voluntary donation, this paper will provide an overview of three alternative approaches: (1) changing the legal definition of death to include anencephalic infants as potential donors (2) commercialization, and (3) the presumed consent model of organ donation.
Introduction
Several years of lengthy and scholarly debate were taken into careful consideration before Congress drafted the first version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in 1968 (UAGA). Despite this extraordinary undertaking, the new legislation failed to live up to its expectations.[1] "The UAGA (1968) made a variety of advances in the law of organ donation, standardizing the process and removing some uncertainties about the scope of permissible donations," (Jaffe, 1990).
The UAGA failed in its mission to develop and implement standardized procedures involved of organ procurement and donation.[2] Problems with ineffective implementation of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act undermined the intended purpose of the legislation, and it has been difficult to regulate compliance with the procedures set forth by the UAGA. Ultimately, the legislation did not have any noticeable effect on the supply of transplantable organs, and policy makers continue to look for a solution to the severe shortage of organs in the United States.
The Problem Statement
The United States is in the midst of a severe shortage of transplantable organs. Over the last several years, medical technology has advanced rapidly enough to make organ transplants a "standard" procedure. The medical community has been unable to meet the demands of the growing list of individuals who would benefit from transplantation.
New immunosuppresive therapies, e.g., cyclosporine, vastly improved the survival rate for transplant patients, making organ transplantation a relatively safe medical procedure. Since transplant surgery has achieved such remarkable success, a growing number of patients and physicians feel transplant surgery would be the preferred medical treatment. As a result, the number of people waiting for a suitable organ to become available has grown exponentially. There are currently over 55,000 people registered with the United Network of Organ Sharing (UNOS) waiting for a human organ to become available.[3] The number of people on the waiting list is expected to increase steadily as the baby boom generation ages, but only a small percentage will be fortunate enough to benefit from the recent advances made in the field of organ and tissue transplantation.
The greatest challenge facing the transplant community is the lack of available organs. Until we find a way to increase the number of voluntary organ donors, 10 patients will die each day waiting for an organ to become available in the United States.
Scarcity of Medical Resources
It is difficult to justify and understand the cause of the American organ shortage. Enough healthy organs become available each day to meet the needs of the medical community, yet only a fraction of those will be donated for medical purposes. The number of organ and tissue donors has not kept pace with the number of patients who could benefit from their healthy organs. According to Carol Beasley, managing director of the Partnership for Organ Donation in Boston, the number of people waiting for organs jumped 300% between 1988 and 1995.[4] The number of donors increased by only 30% over the same time period.[5]
Under the current system of voluntary donation, the medical community only recovers a fraction of the human tissue and organs suitable for transplant. Legislative efforts to alleviate the shortage by removing the obstacles which hinder organ recovery have failed. In 1996, almost 4,000 people died waiting for an organ to become available for transplant.[6]
Because the demand for organs far exceeds the supply, policy makers, legal scholars, and the medical community have debated over the best way to increase the supply of scarce medical resources without jeopardizing the rights of potential donors and their families.
Allocating Scarce Medical Resources
Because of the severe shortage in transplantable organs, much of the public policy efforts in this area have focused on setting standard procedures to ensure equitable distribution. Concerns over the fair allocation of organs prompted the American Medical Association to publish a committee report outlining the medical criteria involved in the identification process for potential donors and recipients.
The issue of genetic compatibility has also raised questions regarding the proper distribution of organs among minority populations. These individuals are much more likely to receive organ transplants from their own community. This certainly seems fair in light of the violence and social conditions in which they live. Veatch (1989) discusses the distinction between social worth and social judgement that is often subjective.
Medical criteria used to allocate organs contain elements of social worth and moral judgment (Veatch, 1989). For example, should we consider AIDS patients as potential candidates for transplantation? How long must an alcoholic be sober before they are eligible for a new liver? This seems like a reasonable question, but it certainly raises questions about social worth. There is a fine line between social behavior and social worth.
The allocation of scarce medical resources is neither unique nor uncommon among medical and legal professionals. A few highly publicized transplant cases helped bring the issue of allocation to the forefront of American consciousness. The American public began to question the fairness of the methods used to match donors with recipients when Governor Casey was moved to the top of the waiting list for a transplant in 1994. One year later, Mickey Mantle was hospitalized, and the public began to speculate on the objectivity of the medical criteria used by transplant centers. Mickey Mantle received a liver transplant 48 hours after being placed on the waiting list.
Press coverage helped bring the issue to the front burner and there was a sudden surge in the number of organs donated by the public. But these highly publicized cases also raised questions about the methods used in the allocation of donor organs. Americans became skeptical of the current system and questioned the ethical basis of the criteria used by UNOS in the allocation of organs. Some felt that Mantle who had been an active alcoholic for most of his life did not deserve a new liver.
Unlike most medical conditions, individuals needing liver transplants are often viewed as responsible for their poor health. Some people believe that alcoholics should not be given equal consideration for medical treatment compared to other (non-alcoholic) patients needing liver transplants. Although UNOS maintains a position that drug and alcohol abuse are not taken into consideration in the allocation process, alcoholics are frequently ruled out because of additional health risks associated with alcoholism and the alcoholic lifestyle. "The patient's style of living might be taken into account, so that an active alcoholic in kidney failure might be excluded on the grounds he has a poor life expectancy even if his new kidneys do not fail."[7]
The medical community has adopted a set of standard criteria used to evaluate and identify potential recipients for available organs. The agreed upon medical standard is based strictly on medical criteria, and the transplant community has publicly denounced measures of social worth or utility in the identification of suitable candidates.
Since organs are considered such a rare and precious resource among the medical community, most transplant centers require patients to undergo a lengthy evaluation before being considered a potential transplant candidate. Preoperative evaluations are used to evaluate the patient's likelihood of survival. A closer look into this process reveals the subjective nature of the evaluation, which appears to contain a number of quality of life questions and measures. Candidates may be disqualified for transplant surgery based upon quality of life measures, which tend to be socially biased. Patients who have sufficient monetary resources and social support networks are preferred to patients who are socially isolated or unmarried.
"The subjectivity of the medical criterion becomes even more blatant when quality of life is taken into account. Sometimes quality of life has become a code word for nonmedical considerations. A wealthy intellectual might be said to have a better quality of life than a mechanic. Even if quality of life is limited to these more narrow medical considerations, inevitably subjective judgements must be made."[8]
The subjective nature of the criterion used to evaluate quality of life could potentially be used as a proxy for social worth.[9]
The Quality of Life Index evaluates the following:[10]
1. Health and functioning
2. Socioeconomics
3. Psychological well-being
4. Family life
Quality of life measures are considered valid indicators of surgical success, but they clearly contain some measure of social judgement. This provides a good illustration of the complex interaction between medical and social criteria used to evaluate potential transplant candidates. "Even assuming that benefits are limited to "the medical" and that these benefits that are taken as the criterion, the problem of subjectivity is not eliminated."[11]
The evaluation process is inherently subjective, and it is not always possible to distinguish medical criteria from social judgement. Even the act of assigning objective medical criterion contains subjective interpretations. "In principle, medical facts alone cannot determine which of these candidates medically benefits more by a transplant. 'Medical benefit' is inherently a subjective notion that will require value judgements by the one allocating the organ."[12]
Allocation disputes are not uncommon, and external agencies are sometimes asked to intervene. The medical community is in general agreement regarding the criteria used in the allocation of organs, but the actual methods used is unique to each transplant center.[13] Regional review committees were recently established in order to monitor consistency at the national level.[14]
The standard medical criteria used to identify the best recipient includes:[15]
1. Geographic weighting
2. Medical urgency
3. Organ Compatibility
4. Waiting time
Until we can significantly increase the supply of voluntary organ and tissue donors, we are doomed to debate the most equitable method of distribution, and the public will continue to look to the government to regulate the evolving organ industry. Despite the fact that the American public claims to support more active procurement procedures, there is an overwhelming apathy among the general population to take active steps in the event of death.[16]
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968
Shortly after the first human heart transplant was performed in 1967, Congress began to think about the potential benefits of anatomical gifts. After much deliberation, Congress passed the first version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in 1968 (Veatch, 1989). The UAGA was intended to increase public awareness of organ transplantation and to stress the need for people to sign organ donor cards. The UAGA also granted immunity to any physician acting in compliance with the UAGA.
The UAGA passed in 1968 represents the government's first, but not last attempt to increase the organ supply through federal legislation. By recognizing the medical utility of anatomical gifts and organs, the medical community successfully convinced Congress to assist them in the recovery of human organs and tissues for medical research and transplant procedures. Unfortunately, the 1968 legislation had virtually no impact on the supply of organs in the United States, so they took a different approach and passed the National Organ Transplant Act in 1984.
The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984
The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-507) provided federal funds to organ procurement agencies, created a national organ-sharing network, and explicitly prohibited the sale or purchase of human organs.[17]
The National organ Transplant Act (NOTA) included specific guidelines for the establishment of a national network to oversee organ procurement centers and provided them with federal funding. The legislation created the National Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), which was established to maintain a national database and waiting list for the 69 organ centers in the United States. The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) is under contract with the federal government to carry out the duties as the designated OPTN.[18]
The purpose of OPTN was to monitor and assess the activity of three main components involved with organ donation and transplantation. In addition, OPTN collects and maintains statistical data for (1) transplant centers, (2) organ procurement organizations, and (3) hospital participation.[19] Federal law requires the OPTN to submit all allocation policies for review by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services.
Second, the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 created a federally funded Task Force to conduct a detailed investigation into the current system of donation. The Task Force was to identify the major problems encountered by organ procurement agencies, and recommend ways to improve the current system.
Findings of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation
Congress created a Task Force on Organ Transplantation to conduct a detailed investigation into the current problems associated with organ procurement and transplantation. In 1986, the Task Force reported their findings in "Organ Transplantation: Issues and Recommendations." The 1986 publication identified problems in the current system of voluntary donation. The Task Force reported on the medical, legal, social, ethical and economic components of organ procurement and transplantation.[20] They concluded that the problem lies within the lack of altruistic donors and suggested appealing to a public sense of community and social responsibility.[21]
Required Request Laws
Required Request laws mark the last serious attempt by the federal government to improve organ donation laws in this country. 1986 federal legislation mandating "Routine Inquiry" of potential organ donors was required in all hospitals receiving Medicare or Medicaid funds. Earlier legislation allowed for the removal of organs in persons over the age of 18 if they had signed an organ donor card. Medical professionals rarely remove organs without consent from a family member. Although federal law protects individuals acting in good faith, obtaining consent from the next of kin has proven to be a major obstacle in voluntary donation. Medical personnel are reluctant to discuss the need for organs upon an individual's death.[22]
It has been suggested that this is a reflection of their personal discomfort with the issue of death and dying[23]. Perhaps they fear being seen as callous or disrespectful of the recently deceased. Fentiman offers several possible explanations including, "a lack of education or cultural sensitivity on the part of health care workers, a concern about the appearance of overreaching a bereaved family, fear of legal liability, and the health care professional's own discomfort with death." The same logic has been used to explain why a number of willing donors had not signed a donor card or notified their next of kin. Fentiman (1993) attributes this to a psychological inability to confront ones own death, and this helps to explain the absence of signed donor cards among patients who claim to support voluntary donation.
The Hastings Center Report
A few years later after passing NOTA, the Hastings Center issued a report describing obstacles found within the system of voluntary organ donation. The Hastings Center Report (1986) concluded in order to develop a more effective donation system, each of the following problems must be addressed:
The key problems that hinder organ donation include:
1. Failure of persons to sign written directives.
2. Failure of police and emergency personnel to locate written directives at accident sites.
3. Uncertainty on part of the public about circumstances and timing of organ recovery.
4. Failure on the part of medical personnel to recover organs on the basis of organ recovery.
5. Failure to systematically approach family members concerning donation.
6. Inefficiency on the part of organ procurement agencies in obtaining referrals of donors.
7. High wastage rates on the part of some organ procurement agencies in failing to place donated organs.
8. Failure to communicate the pronouncement of death to the next of kin.
9. Failure to obtain adequate informed consent from family members.
More than a decade has passed since these issues were first identified, and a number of states, including Tennessee, have implemented their own versions of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.[24] Regardless of this repeated effort, legislation has not helped to increase the number of organs available to the medical community. The problems enumerated by the Task Force and again in the Hastings Center Report have not improved since they were first identified in 1986.
Although the medical, academic, and legal communities have fragmented opinions regarding the best approach to the scarcity problem, they are all in agreement regarding the fundamental issue of allocation: the problem of allocation and donation is inextricably intertwined. If more Americans became voluntary donors, the medical community could recover a greater percentage of available organs for transplant. In turn, we would no longer need to debate and inquire about the equitable distribution of organs since there would be enough organs to supply each of the 40,000 Americans who are currently on the waiting list.
Recently, there has been a strong national movement to create a national database without giving preferential treatment certain regions of the country. Should scarce resources be distributed to the victim's community before becoming available to the general population or distant transplant centers?
Despite numerous attempts to address these problems, they remain unresolved under current law. Neither version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, (1968; 1987) nor the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) had any substantial effect on the severe organ shortage in the United States. Thousands of individuals will die each year while waiting for an organ to become available unless we can agree upon an alternative solution to the crisis at hand.
Commercialization
A popular policy alternative to the current system of altruistic voluntary donation is a commercialized system of organ donation. It is believed that providing financial incentives for voluntary compliance would encourage people to take the initiative to become organ donors.
Under current law, it is illegal to buy or sell human organs, leaving altruistic donation as the only hope for people currently waiting for an organ to become available. The commercial sale of human tissues is a direct violation of the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984.[25] NOTA of 1984,[26] makes it "unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce."[27] This is punishable under criminal law and carries a prison term as well as a $50,000 fine.[28]
Arguments in favor of a commercialized system point out that everyone profits in the organ procurement industry except for the patient (Fentiman, 1990; Banks, 1995). Banks (1995) suggests that by allowing the commercial sale of transplantable organs, a significant number of people would opt into the system. A number of countries including Japan, currently allow the sale of human organs, but a report by the UNOS Ethics Committee expressed concern about the slippery slope problem which may result in the sale of human organs on the black market.[29] In addition, the committee was concerned that some people may actually be less inclined to donate if financial incentives were offered since it would minimize the benefits of altruistic donation.[30] Some individuals may object to the idea of commercialization simply because they believe anatomical gifts should be altruistically motivated. Alternative methods of compensation, such as provisions for a decent burial may be one option since it appears to maintain the integrity of anatomical gifts.
UNOS recommended a regional trial of commercialization since the ultimate effect on the number of donations is unknown.[31] If commercialization turns out to be an effective solution to the profound shortage of transplantable organs, Congress would have to amend current law and establish regulatory guidelines to prevent abuse in the system. Additional regulations would be needed to protect vulnerable populations from exploitation in a commercialized system of organ transplantation and donation.
One convincing argument is the obvious financial compensation provided for the surgeons and transplant centers. In some regards, it only seems fair that the donor receives some financial compensation for his or her participation, offering a system which benefits a third party, e.g., a charity or grandchild who might receive a voucher for college tuition, seems acceptable to most people.
If the United States were to switch to a commercialized system, more people may begin to doubt the fairness involved in allocating organs. Additional findings by the Gallup Organization revealed that only 12% of the survey respondents reported they would be more likely to donate their organs under a commercialized system.[32]
This may be due, in part, to a ceiling effect since such a large percentage of respondents indicate they are willing to donate their organs at the time of death. Survey respondents also reported being concerned with the effect the sale of organs might have on the length and/or quality of treatment they received in the event of a traumatic injury. They were fearful that medical professionals might discontinue medical treatment in order to begin harvesting organs.[33]
Those opposed to the market system feel that certain segments of the population are especially vulnerable to exploitation in a commercialized system.[34] Deutsh (1997) describes problems specific to Medicaid populations, and it seems probable that some segments of the population would feel threatened by such a system. Vulnerable populations already experience disparate treatment under the current system, and it is reasonable to expect poor or disabled individuals would suffer disproportionately in a commercialized system. A recent survey of attitudes regarding organ donation and transplantation revealed that respondents felt wealthy individuals are more likely to receive an organ transplant.[35]
Presumed Consent
The second proposal has considerable support from a large segment of the academic community. This is based upon the fundamental belief that human organs are a community resource, and should be treated as community property at the time of death. This basic assumption is critical to understanding and accepting a model of presumed consent.
Jesse Dukeminier, a lawyer, and David Sanders, a physician, first proposed a system of presumed consent in 1968 (Veatch, 1989). Dukeminier and Sanders adopted four basic principles as the foundation for their model of presumed consent:[36]
1. Making removal of useful cadaver organs routine.
2. Removing organs in a way that does not burden the bereaved.
3. Honoring objection by the "donor" made during his lifetime but also honoring his express wishes even if next of kin objects.
4. If donor neither objects nor expressly assents, honoring kin's objection to organ removal.
For this reason, many legal and medical scholars have proposed federal legislation based upon the notion of presumed consent (Dukeminier & Sanders, 1968; Fentiman, 1990). The presumed consent model views organs as community property and assumes that everyone is an organ donor unless they have opted out of the system.
The proposed model of presumed consent recognizes the need to protect individuals who do not wish to donate their organs. These people would be given ample opportunity to opt out of the system. Everyone opting out of the system would be kept on file in a national database which must be checked prior to the removal of any organs from potential donors. Fentiman suggests the following as opportunities for people to opt out of the presumed consent system.[37]
1. When obtaining or renewing a driver's license.
2. On filing an income tax return.
3. When applying for welfare disability or other governmental benefits.
4. On every visit to a hospital or doctor's office.
5. When a health care provider explicitly requests a patient to consider donating her organs.
6. When executing a living will or health care proxy.
Legislation supporting the presumed consent model would reduce awkward discussion between medical professionals and the families of the deceased since next of kin would not be notified prior to organ procurement.[38]
Since the majority of Americans claim to support the concept of organ and tissue donation, the presumed consent model of organ donation could help bridge the gap between what Americans say and what Americans do. The lack of initiative taken by those who support voluntary organ donation appears to represent their apathy more than their indecision. It can be argued that presumed consent legislation would compensate for the difference between public opinion and public behavior.
The Uniform Determination of Death Act
In 1984, Baby Fae received the first xenograft (interspecies) heart transplant from a baboon, demonstrating the desperate need for neonatal organs for infants and children, (Veatch, 1989). This exemplifies the severe shortage of pediatric organs needed in the United States. Approximately 300 infants are born in this country each year with a severe congenital birth defect known as anencephaly. Anencephalic infants rarely live for more than a couple of days, and most will die within 24 hours after birth.[39]
Anencephaly is a congenital neural tube birth defect. An anencephalic infant is born without a fully functioning brain. Because their brain stem is intact, they are not considered to be clinically or legally brain dead. These infants have a very short life span, but due to biochemical medical degeneration, their organs decompose and become inadequate for medical transplantation. There is no cure or treatment for anencephaly.
Despite the absence of a normally developed and functioning brain, anencephalic infants are born with the rest of their vital organs intact. Due to the rapid deterioration of the child's condition, their organs and tissues are no longer viable for transplantation.[40] This is due to the inevitable onset of cardiopulmonary arrest in anencephalic infants.[41]
The severe shortage of pediatric organ donors has caused medical professionals to consider the use of anencephalic infants as potential donors. The severity of the crisis has led biomedical researchers to push the boundaries of ethical experimentation, as in the case of Baby Fae. Medical professionals have made several appeals to amend the Uniform Determination of Death Act and the National Organ Transplant Act so anencephalic infants can be considered potential organ donors for pediatric populations.
Many experts have suggested that we need to expand our current definition of brain death so anencephalic infants can become donors.[42] Anencephaly is clinically defined as, "markedly defective development of the brain, together with the absence of the bones of the cranial vault in the cerebral and cerebellar hemispheres, and with only a rudimentary brain stem and some traces of basal ganglia present."[43] In response to the unique problem of finding healthy organs for pediatric populations, medical researchers and policy makers have proposed legislation a change in the definition of brain death to include anencephalic infants.[44]
The clinical definition of brain death is, "in the presence of cardiac activity, the permanent loss of cerebral function, manifested clinically by the absence of purposive responsiveness to external stimuli, by absence of cephalic reflexes, by apnea when the patient is disconnected from a respirator, and by an isolectric electroencephalogram (EEG) for at least 30 minutes."[45]
The legal definition of death as defined by the Uniform Determination of Death Act is marked by (1) the irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function or (2) the irreversible cessation of all brain functions.[46] Since anencephalic infants maintain limited brain stem activity during their short lives, they do not satisfy current legal or medical definitions of brain death. The National Organ Transplant Act prohibits the removal of any organs prior to the pronouncement of death. Since anencephalic infants can not be pronounced dead under the current definition, the act of removing organs would be the cause of death.
California courts have already been faced with the controversy surrounding the Constitutional rights of anencephalic infants and found that anencephalic infants do not meet the philosophical definition of a person.[47] As such, they are not entitled to equal protection under the law.[48]
Public Opinion v. Private Action
A 1985 Gallup Poll revealed that 75% of the American population approved of the concept of organ donation, yet, only 17% had completed organ donor cards. Less than half of willing donors had informed their next of kin of their intention to donate their organs and tissues at the time of their death.[49]
The severity of the organ shortage has commanded the attention of the general public on more than one occasion. Public health efforts intended to educate the public have not increased the number of voluntary donors.
Attempts to educate the public in order to increase the number of donors have failed miserably. Since public health efforts have been ineffective, special interest groups have requested government intervention to regulate the organ industry. Policy interventions have been aimed at both the general public and the medical community.
Conclusion
Future attempts to regulate public policy concerning organ donation and transplantation should reflect upon the failures of previous legislative efforts. Judging by the apparent failure of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968, and the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, future legislation should focus on alternatives rather than extending or modifying what we already have.
State courts have been left to preside over disputes related to equitable distribution and Medicaid payments. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is responsible for enforcing federal guidelines and legislation, and Congress recently heard testimony regarding the regional imbalance in the allocation of organs. Recent debate has focused on the fairness of the regional system, which apparently gives preference to recipients living in highly populated locations.
We should be responsive to the unique problems facing pediatric populations, and public policy should be flexible for the benefit of the greater good. Applicable policies should be evaluated and regulated independent of adult populations. After thirty years of ineffective legislation and irresponsible public behavior, perhaps it is time to look for new solutions to the same old problems.
References
Banks, G. J. (1995). Legal and ethical safeguards: Protection of societies' most vulnerable participants in a commercialized organ transplant system. American Journal of Law and Medicine, 21 (45).
Botkin, J. R. (1988). Anencephalic infants as organ donors. Pediatrics, 82, 250-256.
Bureau of National Affairs Special Report (1997). Organ transplants: Policy issues of donation, allocation inextricably intertwined, experts say. BNA's Health Care Policy Report: Special Report, July 14, 1997.
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. Ethical considerations in the allocation of organs and other scarce medical resources among patients. [Special Article] Archives of Internal Medicine, 155 (1), 22-40.
Deutsch, L. B. (1997). Medicaid payment for organ transplants: The extent of mandated coverage. Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, 30, 185. Winter 1997.
Edward W.N.; Childress, J. E.; Perryman, J.; Robards, V.; Rowan, A.; Seely, M.S.; Sterioff, S.; Swanson, M. R. (June 30, 1993). Financial Incentives for Organ Donation: A Report of the UNOS Ethics Committee Payment Subcommittee.
Fentiman, L.C. (1993). Organ donation as a national service: A proposed federal organ donation law. Suffolk University Law Review, 1593, Winter 1997.
Ferrans, C.E., Powers, M.J. (1992). Psychometric assessment of the Quality of Life Index. Res Nurs Health, (15), 29-38.
Friedman, J. A. (1990). Taking the camel by the nose: The anencephalic as a source for pediatric organ transplants. Columbia University Law Review, May 1990.
The Gallup Organization, Inc., "The American Public's Attitudes Toward Organ Donation and Transplantation," conducted for The Partnership for Organ Donation, Boston, MA, February, 1993.
Jaffe, E. S. (1990). She's got Bette Davis['s] eyes: Assessing the nonconsensual removal of cadaver organs under the takings of the due process clause. Columbia Law Review, March 1990.
Historical Notes on the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (1987): References and annotations. Uniform Laws Annotated.
Kolata, G. (1997). Controversy erupts over organ removals. The New York Times [Online]. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/news/national/organ-donor-dispute.html
Koop, C. E. (1983). Increasing the supply of solid organs for transplantation. Public Health Report 1983; 98: 566-572.
Randels, G. (1993). Finding the mean: Liver transplantation for alcoholics. Biolaw, 254-260.
Veatch, R. M. (1989). Death and dying and the biological revolution, 197-223.
[1] Dukeminier as cited in Jaffe, 1990.
[2] Jaffe, 1990.
[3] UNOS Fact Sheet; October 29, 1997.
[4] Carol Beasley, Partnership for Organ Donation, as cited in BNA's Health Care Policy Report, July 14, 1997.
[5]Id.
[6] James Burdick, as cited in BNA's Health Care Policy Report, July 14, 1997.
[7] Veatch, 1989, p.207.
[8]Id.
[9] Ferrans, C.E. & Powers, M.J. (1992). Psychometric assessment of the Quality of Life Index. Res Nurs Health, 1992; 15: 29-38.
[10]Id.
[11] Veatch, 1989, p.207.
[12]Id.
[13] Historical Notes on the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 1987: References and Annotations.
[14]Id.
[15]Id.
[16] Report of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation pursuant to the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act--P.L. 98-507-- "Organ Transplantation: Issues and Recommendations" (April 1986).
[17] Historical Notes on the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 1987: References and Annotations.
[18] UNOS Statement of Principles and Objectives of Equitable Organ Allocation, UNOS, 1997.
[19] Fact Sheet, prepared by Tennessee Donor Services, 1997.
[20] The National Attorney's Committee for Transplant Awareness, (1995). Organ tissue and transplantation: A legal perspective.
[21]Id.
[22] 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 (1988). "Routine Inquiry" requires all hospitals receiving federal funds through Medicare or Medicaid to establish protocols pursuant to which all families of dead or dying patients will be asked to consider donating the organs of their loved one.
[23] Fentiman, 1990.
[24] Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
[25] National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-507); 42 U.S.C.A. § 274 (e) (West 1995).
[26] National Organ Transplant Act § 274
[27]Id. The federal law as amended in 1988, subsec. (c)(1) of Pub.L. No. 100-607 defines "human organ" as the "human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and any other organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived of a fetus) specified by the secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation." Id. at § 27274e.(c)(1). As cited in Banks (1995).
[28] 42 U.S.C.A. §274e (b).
[29]Nelson, et. al (1993). Financial Incentives for Organ Donation: A Report of the UNOS Ethics Committee Payment Subcommittee.
[30]Id.
[31]Id.
[32]The Gallup Organization, Inc., "The American Public's Attitudes Toward Organ Donation and Transplantation," conducted for The Partnership for Organ Donation, Boston, MA, February, 1993.
[33]Id.
[34] Banks, 1995; Deutsch, 1997; Jaffe, 1990.
[35] The Gallup Organization, Inc., "The American Public's Attitudes Toward Organ Donation and Transplantation," conducted for The Partnership for Organ Donation, Boston, MA, February, 1993.
[36] Dukeminier & Sanders, 1968, as cited in Veatch , 1989.
[37] Fentiman, L.C. (1993). Organ donation as a national service: A proposed federal organ donation law. Suffolk University Law Review, 1593. Winter 1997.
[38] Fentiman, 1990.
[39]Id.
[40] Botkin, 1988.
[41]Id.
[42] Anencephaly is a congenital neural tube birth defect. An anencephalic infant is born without a fully functioning brain. Because their brain stem is intact, they are not considered to be clinically and legally brain dead. These infants have a very short life span, but due to biochemical medical degeneration, their organs decompose and become inadequate for medical transplantation to healthier neonates and pediatric patients.
[43] Basal ganglia are the large masses of gray matter at the base of the cerebral hemisphere; currently, the corpus striatum (caudate and lentiform nuclei) and cell groups associated with corpus striatum (Steadman's Medical Dictionary, 1994).
[44] Koop, 1988; Fentiman, 1990; Friedman, 1990.
[45] EEG reading in the absence of hypothermia and poisoning by central nervous system depressants (Steadman's Medical Dictionary, 1994).
[46] Capron, A.M. (1987). Anencephalic donors: Separate the dead from the dying. Hastings Center Report 17:5-9.
[47] Friedman, 1990.
[48] Referring to due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
[49] Historical Notes on the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 1987: References and Annotations.
Published by Elyssa Durant
####
Underwriting the Social Contract: Distributive Justice & Health Care Reform
The Problem Statement
As health care costs climbed exponentially in the 1980's, so did the cost of health insurance plans. As a result, employers began to enroll their employees in managed care organizations, and many Americans were forced to leave their traditional indemnity type plans. With the advent of the health maintenance organization, there is a financial incentive for the underutilization of care. (Blumstein, 1996; Davis & Shoen, 1996).
In order to reduce financial risk, health insurance companies have restricted enrollment to individuals in poor health. By covering the minimal standards of treatment and excluding high risk groups altogether, major US insurance companies have realized that the health insurance market can a be an extremely profitable industry.
The public sector absorbs the cost of unreimbursed care for chronic care in America (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996). Based upon these findings, it seems clear that the money being removed from the health care marketplace is fattening the pockets of CEOs and majority stockholders.
Recent trend towards localized government leaves individuals without a financial safety net. This is the least efficient manner to handle health care costs, and evades the premise that medical care is a natural right in a civilized society. Few Americans feel secure within the current system. The rising costs of medical care contributed to the recent market changes in both the administration and delivery of health services. The financial incentive to cover only the healthiest individuals ignores the fact that medical care is a social good.
Health Insurance Portability Act of 1996
Two years after the Clinton Health Plan was defeated in Congress, Senator Ted Kennedy and Nancy Kassebaum introduced the Kennedy-Kassebaum Bill in response to growing concerns about selective enrollment procedures used by health insurance companies in the private sector. In the final version of the Bill, insurance companies must limit preexisting condition clauses to twelve months. It has been estimated that this provision of the Bill will help an estimated 150,000 Americans obtain health insurance coverage.
There are many levels of the underinsured, including those without any coverage; effective policy must address the needs of the total population without shifting costs from one disadvantaged person to another. Kennedy-Kassebaum fails to address the cost issue-the primary concern for those at risk for losing their health insurance. It does nothing to help the uninsured acquire a decent health policy, and then provides no solution to the critical issue at hand- cost
Since Kennedy-Kassebaum does nothing to control the cost of health insurance and medical care in America, the Bill fails to respond to the issue of greatest concern to the citizens of this country: the cost of medical care. The Bill looks towards the states to develop consumer protections and weakens the regulatory role of the federal government. The majority of the American public is unaware of the fancy footwork involved with this legislation, and the demographics of the population it is intended to protect. In order to assess the utility of this Bill, it is critical to identify the populations at risk for loosing health insurance coverage and the underinsured.
Kassebaum-Kennedy focuses on a slim portion of the uninsured population, and those who would be eligible for COBRA continuation (Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1974). Of the 41 million uninsured Americans, only about 150,000 are expected to benefit from this legislation. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 is really nothing more than smoke and mirrors since it fails to address the true issue at hand-the simple fact that the cost of quality health care in America is becoming a privilege that only the wealthy can afford.
The Cost of Care for Pre-existing Conditions
An individual with high blood pressure may just require prescription medication. Cancer patients in remission may require chemotherapy, and a person suffering with a degenerative disease may be involved in treatment studies. Each condition requires individualized treatment that cannot be based upon the simple economic/cost-benefit analysis used in the utilization review process by large insurance companies. Clearly, the most effective treatment for one patient may not be the best for another. The time required for utilization review may present additional health risks and complications to a patient suffering from a chronic health condition.
Twelve months without insurance coverage may be financially devastating to some patients, and 63% of Americans have already forgone some type of medical treatment within the last year due to financial constraints. Publicity surrounding Kennedy-Kassebaum has hailed the bill as the "be all and end all in progressive legislation, however, in actuality it will only help about 150,000 people.
Recent studies have found that the majority of the uninsured population simply cannot afford to pay the premiums (Donelan et. al., 1996; Hoffman & Rice, 1996). According to their data, only 1% of the Uninsured population is due to current health status and exclusionary preexisting clauses, yet an overwhelming number of insured respondents reported an inability to receive medical care for chronic conditions. The majority of Americans with chronic illness are covered by some type of insurance, yet they are still subject to the utilization review process and access problems that deny or delay medically necessary treatment (Donelan, et. al., Hoffman & Rice, 1996).
Underwriting the Solidarity Principle
Traditional forms of insurance underwriting required that the contract explicitly state which illness or services are not covered by the policy, in advance. If the underwriter did not specifically state a certain condition in the contract, the insurer was held to the terms of the contract and required to pay for services utilized by the policyholder (Stone, 1994, as cited in Durant, 1996).
Increasing numbers of for-profit and non-profit insurance companies began to control costs by refusing to insure individuals who they felt would utilize more services. Insurers began to require health survey status questionnaires (refer to attachment A), and even began implementing AIDS and genetic testing to identify high-risk individuals (Brunetta, as cited in Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). In the 1980s, large insurance companies began including sexual orientation as a high-risk category, by using actuarial sound criteria. Such criteria concluded that gay men were a higher risk for contracting AIDS virus and refused to write policies for anyone believed to be homosexual, (Stone, 1994 as cited in Durant, 1996).
By limiting enrollment to the healthiest members of society, selective enrollment undermines the solidarity principle of health insurance (Davis & Shoen, 1996; Snow, 1996; Stone, 1994). By eliminating those who were suspect of using more services than their healthier counterparts use, insurance companies are able to offer rock bottom prices for young, healthy individuals. By excluding preexisting conditions and requiring certain individuals to purchase high-risk policies, the number of uninsured and underinsured Americans continues to grow exponentially (Durant, 1996).
More individuals are choosing not to purchase insurance simply because they cannot afford it. Even among those with employer based health coverage, the policies frequently exclude coverage for long-term illness or care of chronic conditions (MSNBC News Forum, 1996). Without a standard definition of preexisting conditions, these clauses serve as "wildcards" since they allow insurers to deny coverage for any illness that "manifested itself before the issuing date of the policy (Stone, 1994 as cited in Durant, 1996).
This statement allows insurers to deny treatment for benefits and services for the policyholder for undiagnosed illnesses or conditions of which they were unaware. As a result, the insurers began to demand medical histories of applicants and their families in order to identify high risk individuals (please refer to attachment A).
Legitimacy of Distributive Justice
While there is a legitimate role of government to distribute scarce resources among the nation's neediest individuals, sadly this is not the cause for the mismanagement of medical dollars in the United States today.
There is a big distinction between an individual being denied prescription medication at their local pharmacy due to a cost-effective formulary developed by their Managed Care Organizations (MCOs), than an individual being denied a liver transplant because healthy livers are a scarce resource. While both may have equally devastating consequences, it is more difficult to rationalize a lost life based upon rigid cost benefit analysis and utilization decisions made according to formulas and cost-benefit analysis of treatment protocols.
"The political controversy over the distribution of health care in the United States is an instructive problem in distributive justice. Good health is care is necessary for pursuing most other things in life. Yet equal access to health care would require the government to not only redistribute resources from the rich, healthy to the poor, and infirm, but also restrict the freedom of doctors and other health care providers. Such redistributions may be warranted, but to what level, and to what extent?" Gutmann & Thompson (Page 178).
Blendon and his colleagues have reported similar findings in public opinion polls from 1992 and 1994 (Blendon et. al., 1992; Blendon et. al., 1994). A recent study by the American Medical Association found cost to be of paramount concern to an overwhelming number of Americans (Donelan et. aI., 1996). Of the 40 million uninsured Americans, only 1% attributes their failure to acquire health insurance coverage to their preexisting conditions. Among the uninsured, cost is cited as the primary obstacle in obtaining health insurance coverage. Only 1% of the uninsured attributes their lack of coverage to a preexisting condition.
Based upon these democratic principles of distributive justice, consistent opinion polls demonstrate the legitimate role and public desire for government regulation of the health care industry. It has become obvious that the federal government must intervene in order to protect natural law rights, the social contract, and the Constitution of the United States. Regulation is needed to protect the individual freedoms, liberty, and the pursuit of "health, happiness, and the American Dream."
If America is to be the "Land of Opportunity," then clearly individual health and wellness should be an ideal to reach for. Current models of distributive justice emphasize public consensus as a legitimate role for government intervention. According to a number of studies by Blendon and his colleagues, the public has reported an overwhelming general concern about health care in this country, (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996).
State civil courts are backed up with cases where HMOs have violated the First Amendment (gag orders), the Fourteenth Amendment (due process), and the rights of protected classes under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Countless examples of "anecdotal" evidence appear as headlines everyday across the country. (New York Times, 1996; The New York Daily News, 1996; Long Island Newsday, 1996; LA Times, 1996; Picayne Times, 1996; Columbia Spectator, 1996; Columbia University Record, 1996; US News & World Reports, 1996; Newsweek 1996; Healthline, 1996; The Tennessean, 1996; The Albany Times, 1996; The Nashville Scene, 1996). In their entirety, these case reports represent the human tragedy that lies beneath the web of the very worst of American capitalism: corporate greed.
Identifying Populations At-Risk
A study by The Lewison Group in 1996 reveals insight into the private individual health insurance market. Clearly, individuals choosing to purchase health insurance policies for several hundred dollars each month expect their health care needs and expenditures to exceed that amount Regardless of health status, a young healthy 25 year old who purchases an individual health insurance policy can expect to pay well over $300.00 monthly for a health insurance policy with Empire Blue Shield Blue Cross (based upon 1996 rates, current rates available from the New York State Insurance Department).
Since individual policies are not addressed in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPA), an individual policy with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee excludes preexisting conditions for 24 months (enrollment booklet available upon request). The critical markets in need of reform are the adversely selected individual insurance market, and the state's most vulnerable populations: children; the elderly; the chronically ill; the uninsured; and the underinsured.
For the millions of individuals who have lost their employer based coverage, the cost of private health insurance is prohibitively expensive. Many individuals opt out of the individual market and apply for public assistance when the need arises. Those who have retained their health insurance coverage through their employers are being moved into managed care despite their efforts to retain their indemnity style plans (Davis & Shoen, 1996; The Lewison Group, 1996).
Access to Medical Care
As routine practice, HMOs deny or delay care for all services that are not outright medically necessary. Growing numbers of individuals have suffered irreparable harm, and many have died awaiting approval from their HMO's (The New York Times, 1996; Long Island Newsday, 1996; The Tennessean, 1996; Healthline, 1996). It is hardly a secret that HMOs have fallen short of their promise to provide comprehensive health care for the "whole" individual by emphasizing preventative medicine, using medical management to coordinate care. There is substantial evidence that individuals with chronic conditions receive substandard care in HMOs.
A four-year longitudinal study of medical outcomes found that the elderly, the poor, and persons with chronic conditions were in better health when covered by fee-for-service plans compared with a control group covered in HMOs (Ware et. al., 1996). New statistics released in Washington, DC by the American Medical Association and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation revealed the direct costs of individuals with chronic conditions account for 75% of direct medical expenditures in the United States (Hoffman & Rice, 1996; based upon the National Medical Expenditures Survey; raw data available on CD from the Department of Health and Human Services Washington, DC). 45% of the American population suffers from at least one chronic illness.
If managed healthcare has been found to deliver inadequate care to this population, then we are looking at 100 million individuals who are potentially facing personal and financial crisis as they are moved into managed care. The public already accounts for the largest payment of direct medical expenditures, which means the millions of dollars being made by for-profit insurance companies are not being circulated into the economy to assist in public health costs care. The industry made a 14.8% profit in the 3rd quarter of 1996, however these medical dollars were removed from health care and used to fatten the pockets of CEO's and majority stockholders (Healthline, 1996).
Based upon a new report from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the direct costs for persons with chronic conditions represent 69.4% of national expenditures in personal health care (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996). Their direct medical costs are estimated at $4672.00 annually compared with $817.00 annually for individuals with acute illness (Hoffman & Rice, 1996; based upon National Medical Expenditures Survey 1987, not adjusted for inflation). This population is the most vulnerable to complications in their health and with their source of payment. Large insurance companies only provide adequate coverage for acute illness (Donelan et al., 1996; Hoffman et. al, 1996).
Medicaid Managed Care
Following Tennessee's lead, many states have enrolled their medically indigent populations in Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (MCOs). In Daniels v. Wadley, (926 F. Supp. 1305), the court held that TennCare violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since such procedures eliminate fair hearings and independent medical review of disputes. The court found the pattern of routine denials of care by MCOs participating in the states TennCare program to violate the Medicaid Act since it compounded the problem of institutionalized waiting periods for medical appeals pending independent review by the Medical Review Unit (MRU), (42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a)(8)).
Furthermore, the court ordered federal injunctive protection to participants and beneficiaries because no state law may preempt federal law by depriving individuals of their constitutional rights. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was ordered to revise its utilization review procedures for TennCare recipients in keeping with the Medicaid Act (42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a) (8)) ensuring due process protections for all covered beneficiaries by requiring "services are provided with 'reasonable promptness,'" (926 F. Supp. 1305).
This case is one of 543 civil suits pending in the state courts for violations of the Medicaid Act (based upon a Lexis-Nexis search performed December 26, 1996). With the passing of H.R. 3507 into public law, (The Welfare Reform Bill) private citizens will find little reprieve in the federal courts, so any attempts to hold states accountable for violations of federal law will be feeble at best (Denkeret. al., 1996).
Managed care has shown itself to be a farce of "medical management" in light of all the condemning evidence to the contrary. Timothy Icenogle, a medical doctor in the state of Arizona commented in 1981, "We play sort of an advocacy role. I think the public demands something more from physicians than to just be a blob of bureaucrats, and I think we have to take a stand now and then. Our role essentially as patient advocate, is to tell them, well, just because the insurance company is not going to pay, that is not the end of all the resources," (Icenogle, as cited in Gutmann & Thompson, 1996).
Never has this statement been needed more than it is today. Unfortunately, as more insurance companies refuse to pay for medical treatment, fewer resources become available for patients in desperate need of financial assistance. As Judge Kessler eloquently stated as she handed down her decision in Salazar v. District of Columbia, No. 93-452, December 11, 1996, "behind every fact found herein is a human face and the reality of being poor in the richest nation on earth, (936 F. Supp. Slip op. At 3).
Perhaps most distressing is the lack of accountability for mismanaged healthcare and improper denials of medically necessary treatment. HMOs claim immunity under ERISA, and leaving individuals without recourse in a sea contractual language and lengthy court calendars. It is evident that individuals protected under the Medicaid Act are not fundamentally different from other populations entrapped in the maze of managed care. They are simply those who have "had their day in court."
Due Process Protections
Since all Americans are theoretically entitled to due process protections under the constitution of the United States, it seems the federal courts are long overdue for making such a public statement. We are wasting precious time and losing millions in valuable human resources as we await decisions to be handed down from state courts. The Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to hear New York's request for an ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1985) waiver, making health maintenance organizations liable for medical malpractice in the state of New York.
When HMOs deny care from patients, it is ludicrous to hold individual physicians liable for the utilization decisions made by decentralized corporate review boards. It is time to take a serious look at tort reform, and demand action by the Supreme Court as they approach the date of New York's ERISA hearing. A blanket court ruling upholding Daniels v. Wadley, and Salazar v. District of Columbia is desperately needed to avoid an avalanche of liability suits filed in state courts. The court must uphold Daniels v. Wadley, and Salazar v. District of Columbia if further lives are to be saved in medicine rather than wasted away in the utilization review procedures. While we wait patiently for District of Columbia circuit court to order injunctive relief, the number of individuals suffering irreparable harm due to the systematic denial of medical care grows larger each day.
The history of Medicaid Managed Care does not provide a very optimistic look into the future of TennCare recipients and Medicaid beneficiaries in states around the country. Dating back to the implementation of the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS) in 1981, there are documented cases where "people reportedly died for lack of medical treatment before their eligibility was determined," (Varley, as cited in Gutman & Thompson, I 996). This leaves me to wonder why the states continue to enroll their most vulnerable populations into a system of managed care that has proven to be a disaster.
Perhaps worthy of comment is that Arizona is the only state to have voted Republican in every election since 1948-certainly provides insight into the conservative morale of the state. Although Arizona was the last state to accept the Medicaid cost sharing incentive proposed by the federal government in 1966, it was the first state to force its medically indigent population into managed care in 1981.
Violating Federal Law
Rigid pre-certification requirements and nonspecific utilization review procedures place strategic barriers to access medical treatment and services in Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). Pre-certification requirements are strategic barriers incorporated into the "black box" of utilization review that institutionalizes exclusionary waiting periods and routine denials of medically necessary treatment. According to federal law, "care and services are to be provided in a manner consistent with the simplicity of administration and the best interests of recipients," (42 U.S.C. § I 396a (a) (19)). Clearly, such rigid pre-certification requirements that complicate administrative processing and paperwork on the part of the enrolled beneficiaries is a violation of United States Code.
Furthermore, using primary care providers as a mechanism to limit access to specialists not only complicates administrative processing, but limits enrolled beneficiaries choice of health professionals beyond what is available to the general public in the geographic area (42 U.S.C. § 1 396a (a)(30)(A)). Certainly referral procedures do not "assure that recipients will have their choice of health professionals within the plan to the extent possible and appropriate," (42 U.S.C. § 434.29). Under this provision, it seems that any individual, especially those with chronic health conditions or disabilities should be allowed to choose a primary care provider with more expertise than a nurse practitioner. I will argue that a neurologist is more familiar with the unique needs of a patient with Multiple Sclerosis than a nurse practitioner is with little to no knowledge specific to the medical management of degenerative
Under the Medicaid Act of 1966, covered beneficiaries may appeal any utilization review decision which denies care or limits services. The Medicaid Act gives individuals the right to a fair hearing in front of an impartial independent Medical Review Unit (MRU). Furthermore, the Medicaid Act clearly states that medical services for a Medicaid beneficiary may not be terminated until the said beneficiary receives such a hearing
Conclusion
The country as a whole must realize what Judge Kessler told her courtroom. Her words are certainly words I will not forget-certainly worth being quoted at length:
"This case is about people-children and adults who are sick, poor, and vulnerable-for whom life, in the memorable words of poet Langston Hughes, "ain't been no crystal stair". It is written in the dry and bloodless language of "the Iaw"-statistics, acronyms of agencies and bureaucratic entities, Supreme Court case names and quotes, official governmental reports, periodicity tables, etc. But let there be no forgetting the real people to whom this bloodless language gives voice: anxious working parents who are too poor to obtain medications or heart catheter procedures or lead poisoning screening for their children, AIDS patients unable to get treatment, elderly persons suffering from chronic conditions like diabetes and heart disease who require constant monitoring arid medical attention. Behind every fact found herein is a human face and the reality of being poor in the richest nation on earth. (Slip op. At 3). -Judge Gladys Kessler, December 11, 1996.
Patients are routinely being denied medical care-- and being forced into a system that incorporates long waiting periods into their physician contracts and handbooks (Green, 1996). The private for-profit insurance industry has single-handedly undermined the solidarity principle of health insurance by using strict underwriting techniques, ridiculous treatment protocols; inconsistent definitions of chronic illness and rigid utilization review procedures unavailable to the consumer; and inconsistent definitions of "chronic illness" and "emergency" (Dallek, 1996). It is an industry which justified using sexual orientation to avoid covering AIDS patients, calling such methods "actuarially sound." The privatization of a public good has removed millions of dollars from the healthcare marketplace with "medical loss ratios" of 57% compared to 85% in the traditional health insurance market
Although a slim portion of the general public is unable to obtain health insurance coverage due to a preexisting condition, the more critical issue remains the cost of coverage. The cost of medical care will remain an issue since recent legislative efforts evade the issue. Recent changes in the delivery of health services is of grave concern and different options must be considered in order to find more effective ways to provide public and private assistance-
MANAGED CARE IS NOT THE ANSWER!!! FOR-PROFIT HEALTH CARE IS NOT THE ANSWER! PRIVATIZATION IS NOT THE ANSWER!
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Published by Elyssa Durant
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Underwriting the Social Contract: Distributive Justice & Health Care Reform
The Problem Statement
As health care costs climbed exponentially in the 1980's, so did the cost of health insurance plans. As a result, employers began to enroll their employees in managed care organizations, and many Americans were forced to leave their traditional indemnity type plans. With the advent of the health maintenance organization, there is a financial incentive for the underutilization of care. (Blumstein, 1996; Davis & Shoen, 1996).
In order to reduce financial risk, health insurance companies have restricted enrollment to individuals in poor health. By covering the minimal standards of treatment and excluding high risk groups altogether, major US insurance companies have realized that the health insurance market can a be an extremely profitable industry.
The public sector absorbs the cost of unreimbursed care for chronic care in America (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996). Based upon these findings, it seems clear that the money being removed from the health care marketplace is fattening the pockets of CEOs and majority stockholders.
Recent trend towards localized government leaves individuals without a financial safety net. This is the least efficient manner to handle health care costs, and evades the premise that medical care is a natural right in a civilized society. Few Americans feel secure within the current system. The rising costs of medical care contributed to the recent market changes in both the administration and delivery of health services. The financial incentive to cover only the healthiest individuals ignores the fact that medical care is a social good.
Health Insurance Portability Act of 1996
Two years after the Clinton Health Plan was defeated in Congress, Senator Ted Kennedy and Nancy Kassebaum introduced the Kennedy-Kassebaum Bill in response to growing concerns about selective enrollment procedures used by health insurance companies in the private sector. In the final version of the Bill, insurance companies must limit preexisting condition clauses to twelve months. It has been estimated that this provision of the Bill will help an estimated 150,000 Americans obtain health insurance coverage.
There are many levels of the underinsured, including those without any coverage; effective policy must address the needs of the total population without shifting costs from one disadvantaged person to another. Kennedy-Kassebaum fails to address the cost issue-the primary concern for those at risk for losing their health insurance. It does nothing to help the uninsured acquire a decent health policy, and then provides no solution to the critical issue at hand- cost
Since Kennedy-Kassebaum does nothing to control the cost of health insurance and medical care in America, the Bill fails to respond to the issue of greatest concern to the citizens of this country: the cost of medical care. The Bill looks towards the states to develop consumer protections and weakens the regulatory role of the federal government. The majority of the American public is unaware of the fancy footwork involved with this legislation, and the demographics of the population it is intended to protect. In order to assess the utility of this Bill, it is critical to identify the populations at risk for loosing health insurance coverage and the underinsured.
Kassebaum-Kennedy focuses on a slim portion of the uninsured population, and those who would be eligible for COBRA continuation (Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1974). Of the 41 million uninsured Americans, only about 150,000 are expected to benefit from this legislation. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 is really nothing more than smoke and mirrors since it fails to address the true issue at hand-the simple fact that the cost of quality health care in America is becoming a privilege that only the wealthy can afford.
The Cost of Care for Pre-existing Conditions
An individual with high blood pressure may just require prescription medication. Cancer patients in remission may require chemotherapy, and a person suffering with a degenerative disease may be involved in treatment studies. Each condition requires individualized treatment that cannot be based upon the simple economic/cost-benefit analysis used in the utilization review process by large insurance companies. Clearly, the most effective treatment for one patient may not be the best for another. The time required for utilization review may present additional health risks and complications to a patient suffering from a chronic health condition.
Twelve months without insurance coverage may be financially devastating to some patients, and 63% of Americans have already forgone some type of medical treatment within the last year due to financial constraints. Publicity surrounding Kennedy-Kassebaum has hailed the bill as the "be all and end all in progressive legislation, however, in actuality it will only help about 150,000 people.
Recent studies have found that the majority of the uninsured population simply cannot afford to pay the premiums (Donelan et. al., 1996; Hoffman & Rice, 1996). According to their data, only 1% of the Uninsured population is due to current health status and exclusionary preexisting clauses, yet an overwhelming number of insured respondents reported an inability to receive medical care for chronic conditions. The majority of Americans with chronic illness are covered by some type of insurance, yet they are still subject to the utilization review process and access problems that deny or delay medically necessary treatment (Donelan, et. al., Hoffman & Rice, 1996).
Underwriting the Solidarity Principle
Traditional forms of insurance underwriting required that the contract explicitly state which illness or services are not covered by the policy, in advance. If the underwriter did not specifically state a certain condition in the contract, the insurer was held to the terms of the contract and required to pay for services utilized by the policyholder (Stone, 1994, as cited in Durant, 1996).
Increasing numbers of for-profit and non-profit insurance companies began to control costs by refusing to insure individuals who they felt would utilize more services. Insurers began to require health survey status questionnaires (refer to attachment A), and even began implementing AIDS and genetic testing to identify high-risk individuals (Brunetta, as cited in Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). In the 1980s, large insurance companies began including sexual orientation as a high-risk category, by using actuarial sound criteria. Such criteria concluded that gay men were a higher risk for contracting AIDS virus and refused to write policies for anyone believed to be homosexual, (Stone, 1994 as cited in Durant, 1996).
By limiting enrollment to the healthiest members of society, selective enrollment undermines the solidarity principle of health insurance (Davis & Shoen, 1996; Snow, 1996; Stone, 1994). By eliminating those who were suspect of using more services than their healthier counterparts use, insurance companies are able to offer rock bottom prices for young, healthy individuals. By excluding preexisting conditions and requiring certain individuals to purchase high-risk policies, the number of uninsured and underinsured Americans continues to grow exponentially (Durant, 1996).
More individuals are choosing not to purchase insurance simply because they cannot afford it. Even among those with employer based health coverage, the policies frequently exclude coverage for long-term illness or care of chronic conditions (MSNBC News Forum, 1996). Without a standard definition of preexisting conditions, these clauses serve as "wildcards" since they allow insurers to deny coverage for any illness that "manifested itself before the issuing date of the policy (Stone, 1994 as cited in Durant, 1996).
This statement allows insurers to deny treatment for benefits and services for the policyholder for undiagnosed illnesses or conditions of which they were unaware. As a result, the insurers began to demand medical histories of applicants and their families in order to identify high risk individuals (please refer to attachment A).
Legitimacy of Distributive Justice
While there is a legitimate role of government to distribute scarce resources among the nation's neediest individuals, sadly this is not the cause for the mismanagement of medical dollars in the United States today. There is a big distinction between an individual being denied prescription medication at their local pharmacy due to a cost-effective formulary developed by their Managed Care Organizations (MCOs), than an individual being denied a liver transplant because healthy livers are a scarce resource. While both may have equally devastating consequences, it is more difficult to rationalize a lost life based upon rigid cost benefit analysis and utilization decisions made according to formulas and cost-benefit analysis of treatment protocols.
"The political controversy over the distribution of health care in the United States is an instructive problem in distributive justice. Good health is care is necessary for pursuing most other things in life. Yet equal access to health care would require the government to not only redistribute resources from the rich, healthy to the poor, and infirm, but also restrict the freedom of doctors and other health care providers. Such redistributions may be warranted, but to what level, and to what extent?" Gutmann & Thompson (Page 178).
Blendon and his colleagues have reported similar findings in public opinion polls from 1992 and 1994 (Blendon et. al., 1992; Blendon et. al., 1994). A recent study by the American Medical Association found cost to be of paramount concern to an overwhelming number of Americans (Donelan et. aI., 1996). Of the 40 million uninsured Americans, only 1% attributes their failure to acquire health insurance coverage to their preexisting conditions. Among the uninsured, cost is cited as the primary obstacle in obtaining health insurance coverage. Only 1% of the uninsured attributes their lack of coverage to a preexisting condition.
Based upon these democratic principles of distributive justice, consistent opinion polls demonstrate the legitimate role and public desire for government regulation of the health care industry. It has become obvious that the federal government must intervene in order to protect natural law rights, the social contract, and the Constitution of the United States. Regulation is needed to protect the individual freedoms, liberty, and the pursuit of "health, happiness, and the American Dream."
If America is to be the "Land of Opportunity," then clearly individual health and wellness should be an ideal to reach for. Current models of distributive justice emphasize public consensus as a legitimate role for government intervention. According to a number of studies by Blendon and his colleagues, the public has reported an overwhelming general concern about health care in this country, (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996).
State civil courts are backed up with cases where HMOs have violated the First Amendment (gag orders), the Fourteenth Amendment (due process), and the rights of protected classes under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Countless examples of "anecdotal" evidence appear as headlines everyday across the country. (New York Times, 1996; The New York Daily News, 1996; Long Island Newsday, 1996; LA Times, 1996; Picayne Times, 1996; Columbia Spectator, 1996; Columbia University Record, 1996; US News & World Reports, 1996; Newsweek 1996; Healthline, 1996; The Tennessean, 1996; The Albany Times, 1996; The Nashville Scene, 1996). In their entirety, these case reports represent the human tragedy that lies beneath the web of the very worst of American capitalism: corporate greed.
Identifying Populations At-Risk
A study by The Lewison Group in 1996 reveals insight into the private individual health insurance market. Clearly, individuals choosing to purchase health insurance policies for several hundred dollars each month expect their health care needs and expenditures to exceed that amount Regardless of health status, a young healthy 25 year old who purchases an individual health insurance policy can expect to pay well over $300.00 monthly for a health insurance policy with Empire Blue Shield Blue Cross (based upon 1996 rates, current rates available from the New York State Insurance Department).
Since individual policies are not addressed in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPA), an individual policy with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee excludes preexisting conditions for 24 months (enrollment booklet available upon request). The critical markets in need of reform are the adversely selected individual insurance market, and the state's most vulnerable populations: children; the elderly; the chronically ill; the uninsured; and the underinsured.
For the millions of individuals who have lost their employer based coverage, the cost of private health insurance is prohibitively expensive. Many individuals opt out of the individual market and apply for public assistance when the need arises. Those who have retained their health insurance coverage through their employers are being moved into managed care despite their efforts to retain their indemnity style plans (Davis & Shoen, 1996; The Lewison Group, 1996).
Access to Medical Care
As routine practice, HMOs deny or delay care for all services that are not outright medically necessary. Growing numbers of individuals have suffered irreparable harm, and many have died awaiting approval from their HMO's (The New York Times, 1996; Long Island Newsday, 1996; The Tennessean, 1996; Healthline, 1996). It is hardly a secret that HMOs have fallen short of their promise to provide comprehensive health care for the "whole" individual by emphasizing preventative medicine, using medical management to coordinate care. There is substantial evidence that individuals with chronic conditions receive substandard care in HMOs.
A four-year longitudinal study of medical outcomes found that the elderly, the poor, and persons with chronic conditions were in better health when covered by fee-for-service plans compared with a control group covered in HMOs (Ware et. al., 1996). New statistics released in Washington, DC by the American Medical Association and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation revealed the direct costs of individuals with chronic conditions account for 75% of direct medical expenditures in the United States (Hoffman & Rice, 1996; based upon the National Medical Expenditures Survey; raw data available on CD from the Department of Health and Human Services Washington, DC). 45% of the American population suffers from at least one chronic illness.
If managed healthcare has been found to deliver inadequate care to this population, then we are looking at 100 million individuals who are potentially facing personal and financial crisis as they are moved into managed care. The public already accounts for the largest payment of direct medical expenditures, which means the millions of dollars being made by for-profit insurance companies are not being circulated into the economy to assist in public health costs care. The industry made a 14.8% profit in the 3rd quarter of 1996, however these medical dollars were removed from health care and used to fatten the pockets of CEO's and majority stockholders (Healthline, 1996).
Based upon a new report from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the direct costs for persons with chronic conditions represent 69.4% of national expenditures in personal health care (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996). Their direct medical costs are estimated at $4672.00 annually compared with $817.00 annually for individuals with acute illness (Hoffman & Rice, 1996; based upon National Medical Expenditures Survey 1987, not adjusted for inflation). This population is the most vulnerable to complications in their health and with their source of payment. Large insurance companies only provide adequate coverage for acute illness (Donelan et al., 1996; Hoffman et. al, 1996).
Medicaid Managed Care
Following Tennessee's lead, many states have enrolled their medically indigent populations in Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (MCOs). In Daniels v. Wadley, (926 F. Supp. 1305), the court held that TennCare violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since such procedures eliminate fair hearings and independent medical review of disputes. The court found the pattern of routine denials of care by MCOs participating in the states TennCare program to violate the Medicaid Act since it compounded the problem of institutionalized waiting periods for medical appeals pending independent review by the Medical Review Unit (MRU), (42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a)(8)).
Furthermore, the court ordered federal injunctive protection to participants and beneficiaries because no state law may preempt federal law by depriving individuals of their constitutional rights. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was ordered to revise its utilization review procedures for TennCare recipients in keeping with the Medicaid Act (42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a) (8)) ensuring due process protections for all covered beneficiaries by requiring "services are provided with 'reasonable promptness,'" (926 F. Supp. 1305).
This case is one of 543 civil suits pending in the state courts for violations of the Medicaid Act (based upon a Lexis-Nexis search performed December 26, 1996). With the passing of H.R. 3507 into public law, (The Welfare Reform Bill) private citizens will find little reprieve in the federal courts, so any attempts to hold states accountable for violations of federal law will be feeble at best (Denkeret. al., 1996).
Managed care has shown itself to be a farce of "medical management" in light of all the condemning evidence to the contrary. Timothy Icenogle, a medical doctor in the state of Arizona commented in 1981, "We play sort of an advocacy role. I think the public demands something more from physicians than to just be a blob of bureaucrats, and I think we have to take a stand now and then. Our role essentially as patient advocate, is to tell them, well, just because the insurance company is not going to pay, that is not the end of all the resources," (Icenogle, as cited in Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Never has this statement been needed more than it is today. Unfortunately, as more insurance companies refuse to pay for medical treatment, fewer resources become available for patients in desperate need of financial assistance. As Judge Kessler eloquently stated as she handed down her decision in Salazar v. District of Columbia, No. 93-452, December 11, 1996, "behind every fact found herein is a human face and the reality of being poor in the richest nation on earth, (936 F. Supp. Slip op. At 3).
Perhaps most distressing is the lack of accountability for mismanaged healthcare and improper denials of medically necessary treatment. HMOs claim immunity under ERISA, and leaving individuals without recourse in a sea contractual language and lengthy court calendars. It is evident that individuals protected under the Medicaid Act are not fundamentally different from other populations entrapped in the maze of managed care. They are simply those who have "had their day in court."
Due Process Protections
Since all Americans are theoretically entitled to due process protections under the constitution of the United States, it seems the federal courts are long overdue for making such a public statement. We are wasting precious time and losing millions in valuable human resources as we await decisions to be handed down from state courts. The Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to hear New York's request for an ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1985) waiver, making health maintenance organizations liable for medical malpractice in the state of New York.
When HMOs deny care from patients, it is ludicrous to hold individual physicians liable for the utilization decisions made by decentralized corporate review boards. It is time to take a serious look at tort reform, and demand action by the Supreme Court as they approach the date of New York's ERISA hearing. A blanket court ruling upholding Daniels v. Wadley, and Salazar v. District of Columbia is desperately needed to avoid an avalanche of liability suits filed in state courts. The court must uphold Daniels v. Wadley, and Salazar v. District of Columbia if further lives are to be saved in medicine rather than wasted away in the utilization review procedures. While we wait patiently for District of Columbia circuit court to order injunctive relief, the number of individuals suffering irreparable harm due to the systematic denial of medical care grows larger each day.
The history of Medicaid Managed Care does not provide a very optimistic look into the future of TennCare recipients and Medicaid beneficiaries in states around the country. Dating back to the implementation of the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS) in 1981, there are documented cases where "people reportedly died for lack of medical treatment before their eligibility was determined," (Varley, as cited in Gutman & Thompson, I 996). This leaves me to wonder why the states continue to enroll their most vulnerable populations into a system of managed care that has proven to be a disaster.
Perhaps worthy of comment is that Arizona is the only state to have voted Republican in every election since 1948-certainly provides insight into the conservative morale of the state. Although Arizona was the last state to accept the Medicaid cost sharing incentive proposed by the federal government in 1966, it was the first state to force its medically indigent population into managed care in 1981.
Violating Federal Law
Rigid pre-certification requirements and nonspecific utilization review procedures place strategic barriers to access medical treatment and services in Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). Pre-certification requirements are strategic barriers incorporated into the "black box" of utilization review that institutionalizes exclusionary waiting periods and routine denials of medically necessary treatment. According to federal law, "care and services are to be provided in a manner consistent with the simplicity of administration and the best interests of recipients," (42 U.S.C. § I 396a (a) (19)). Clearly, such rigid pre-certification requirements that complicate administrative processing and paperwork on the part of the enrolled beneficiaries is a violation of
United States Code.
Furthermore, using primary care providers as a mechanism to limit access to specialists not only complicates administrative processing, but limits enrolled beneficiaries choice of health professionals beyond what is available to the general public in the geographic area (42 U.S.C. § 1 396a (a)(30)(A)). Certainly referral procedures do not "assure that recipients will have their choice of health professionals within the plan to the extent possible and appropriate," (42 U.S.C. § 434.29). Under this provision, it seems that any individual, especially those with chronic health conditions or disabilities should be allowed to choose a primary care provider with more expertise than a nurse practitioner. I will argue that a neurologist is more familiar with the unique needs of a patient with Multiple Sclerosis than a nurse practitioner is with little to no knowledge specific to the medical management of degenerative
Under the Medicaid Act of 1966, covered beneficiaries may appeal any utilization review decision which denies care or limits services. The Medicaid Act gives individuals the right to a fair hearing in front of an impartial independent Medical Review Unit (MRU). Furthermore, the Medicaid Act clearly states that medical services for a Medicaid beneficiary may not be terminated until the said beneficiary receives such a hearing
Conclusion
The country as a whole must realize what Judge Kessler told her courtroom. Her words are certainly words I will not forget-certainly worth being quoted at length:
"This case is about people-children and adults who are sick, poor, and vulnerable-for whom life, in the memorable words of poet Langston Hughes, "ain't been no crystal stair". It is written in the dry and bloodless language of "the Iaw"-statistics, acronyms of agencies and bureaucratic entities, Supreme Court case names and quotes, official governmental reports, periodicity tables, etc. But let there be no forgetting the real people to whom this bloodless language gives voice: anxious working parents who are too poor to obtain medications or heart catheter procedures or lead poisoning screening for their children, AIDS patients unable to get treatment, elderly persons suffering from chronic conditions like diabetes and heart disease who require constant monitoring arid medical attention. Behind every fact found herein is a human face and the reality of being poor in the richest nation on earth. (Slip op. At 3). -Judge Gladys Kessler, December 11, 1996.
Patients are routinely being denied medical care-- and being forced into a system that incorporates long waiting periods into their physician contracts and handbooks (Green, 1996). The private for-profit insurance industry has single-handedly undermined the solidarity principle of health insurance by using strict underwriting techniques, ridiculous treatment protocols; inconsistent definitions of chronic illness and rigid utilization review procedures unavailable to the consumer; and inconsistent definitions of "chronic illness" and "emergency" (Dallek, 1996). It is an industry which justified using sexual orientation to avoid covering AIDS patients, calling such methods "actuarially sound." The privatization of a public good has removed millions of dollars from the healthcare marketplace with "medical loss ratios" of 57% compared to 85% in the traditional health insurance market
Although a slim portion of the general public is unable to obtain health insurance coverage due to a preexisting condition, the more critical issue remains the cost of coverage. The cost of medical care will remain an issue since recent legislative efforts evade the issue. Recent changes in the delivery of health services is of grave concern and different options must be considered in order to find more effective ways to provide public and private assistance-MANAGED CARE IS NOT THE ANSWER!!! FOR-PROFIT HEALTH CARE IS NOT THE ANSWER! PRIVATIZATION IS NOT THE ANSWER!
References
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Blumstein, J. F. (1996). The fraud and abuse statute in an evolving health care market Life in the health care speakeasy. American Journal of Law and Medicine,22(2), 205-231.
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Published by Elyssa Durant
####
Medical Treatment for Individuals with Disabilities by Elyssa Durant, Ed.M.
Futile Care for Babies: Baby K and Anencephalic Infants
Baby K is frequently used as the classic example of an infant with a hopeless medical condition. Born with a congenital defect known as anencephaly, Baby K was born without a brain. Photographs of anencephalic infants leave us with an unsettling image of the physical reality ofthis particular birth defect. Dr. Boehm of Vanderbilt University Medical Center gives a graphic description of "monster children," making it easier on our psyches to withdraw medical care.
Anencephaly provides a good example of futile care for infants since it represents the most extreme case of disfigurement and congenital deformity. The case involving Baby K was a landmark ADA decision filed in district court against Fairfax Hospital in Fairfax, Virginia.
Although Baby K was capable of maintaining the most basic life functions at the early stages of her infancy, her mother soon began to bring her to the emergency room to prolong her life when Baby K encountered respiratory failure. The suit filed by Baby K's mother against Fairfax Hospital raises several legal questions regarding the definition of futile care and medical treatment for Americans with disabilities. The case eventually became a landmark ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act) case when the district court ruled that Baby K was being discriminated against because of her anencephaly-clearly a disability under the definition of the ADA.
The court found that Baby K was otherwise qualified for medical treatment, however, they failed to address other critical issues including an agreed upon clinical definition of futile care. Since Baby K was privately insured, the court also did not address the allocation of resources and public funding for medically futile care.
Although the court took an interesting approach to decide this case, I am rather sympathetic to the plight ofthe physicians at Fairfax Hospital since Baby K had little chance of survival beyond her early infancy.
Despite my agreement on the single issue of anencephaly, I would be hesitant to make a generalization regarding futile care for all medically "hopeless" cases-especially those involving degenerative conditions such as Multiple Sclerosis (MS) and other forms of spinal and/or brain trauma.
In the case of Baby K, it is the literal definition (or lack thereof) which I find so troubling. Is medical research on myelin regeneration futile? Are the expenditures for spinal rehabilitation inappropriate? Who has the authority and expertise to make decisions about the quality of life and who decides who shall live and who shall die? What makes one life more valuable to society and worthy of medical expenditures?
Modern medical science is just starting to recognize the strength of the mind-body relationship and traditional scientific models have vastly underestimated the will to live and the ability to recover from traumatic injuries.
These modern day "miracles" on the evening news- patients with no hope who suddenly wake up from a twenty-year coma convey a message of hope and cast doubt on the expertise of the American Medical
Association.
Published by Elyssa Durant
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